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ARTICLES
The Human Right of Property
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ *
Despite the absence of a comprehensive global pact on the
subject, the human right to property protection—a right of
property but only rarely to specific property—exists and is
recognized in 21 human rights instruments, including some
of the most widely ratified multilateral treaties ever adopted.
The Cold War’s omission of property rights in the two principal treaties on human rights, namely the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has
been overtaken by events. But that reality continues to be resisted by legal scholars, including human rights advocates,
as well as by many across the political spectrum from many
on the left (who associate property rights with misguided
“Western” models for economic development) to some on
the right (who see it as yet another intrusion on sovereign
discretion sought by global elites). It is also resisted by U.S.
courts which continue to assert that international law regulates the treatment of foreign property but not of “domestic
takings” involving actions directed at a state’s own citizens.
This Article surveys the reality of internationalized property rights protections outside the usual context in which it
*

Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York University School of Law. This is an extended version of the Fifth Annual Louis
Henkin Lecture on Human Rights: “The Human Right to Property,” presented at
the University of Miami School of Law on March 2, 2017. The author is grateful
for comments received on that occasion and at subsequent presentations at Queen
Mary University of London and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in
Geneva, and also for the able research assistance of Melina E. De Bona, Johann
Justus Vasel, and Nahuel Maisley
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is addressed, namely to protect the property of foreign investors in the host states in which they operate. It canvasses
the policy and jurisprudential objections to the idea of a
treaty-based human right of property, addresses how the
U.S. has contributed to the internationalization of this human right, and contrasts the property caselaw of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights with the ways U.S. courts
have largely resisted the idea that the international human
right of property exists. It addresses how human rights treaties respond to objections to property rights writ large and
uses, inter alia, the property rulings of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to advance a non-instrumentalist defense of the human right to property protection based on
“moral intuitions” of what human dignity requires. Finally,
the Article defends the fragmented nature of the distinct international regimes that protect property from those who
would seek to harmonize its contours either through a global
agreement or by recognizing its status as customary law.
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INTRODUCTION
Although states today do not routinely expropriate private property without compensation, they continue to abuse their power over
property. Consider two, not atypical, cases.
In 2011, Nelson Mezerhane, a successful Venezuelan entrepreneur who owned a leading bank, the newspaper Diario El Globo,
and the television channel Globovisión, filed a seventeen-count
complaint against Venezuela in a federal district court in the United
States.1 He alleged that, beginning in 2004, during Hugo Chavez’s
term as President, the Venezuelan government targeted his enterprises because of their editorial independence.2 Eventually, through
what he asserted were “illegitimate judicial proceedings,” the
Chavez regime expropriated all of Mr. Mezerhane’s and his family’s
assets, stripped him of his Venezuelan citizenship, and revoked his
rights to travel or earn a livelihood, and to acquire, sell, or convey
any property.3 Mr. Mezerhane asserted that, as a result of these actions, he was rendered stateless.4 At the time of filing his claims, he
was seeking asylum in the United States.5 Comparable expropriating
actions to silence political dissent continue to occur in places like
Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China.6

1

Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 546–47
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016), discussed infra Part IV.
2
Id. at 547.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Jordan Gans-Morse, Threats to Property Rights in Russia: From
Private Coercion to State Aggression, 28 POST-SOVIET AFF. 263, 264 (2012);
Emily Korstanje, China’s Oppression of Tibetans has Dramatically Increased,
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Contemporary deprivations of property rights do not always involve instances in which a government rescinds prior title to land
out of political pique. Claims to property, now as always, continue
to be made by groups of indigenous peoples who have lived and
farmed lands for generations without any formal legal title but who
face displacement by a state’s decision to sell tracks of that land to
private owners—frequently to huge agribusinesses.7 When this occurred to the Sawhoyamaxa Community in Paraguay, they brought
a claim in 2006 against that state before the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (IACHR).8 Both representatives of the tribe and
expert witnesses on its behalf claimed that Paraguay’s denial of ancestral lands forced tribe members to live in “precarious” circumstances with limited access to food, drinkable water, or medical care,
which led to many preventable deaths in violation of the tribe’s right
to life9—and not only its right to property.10 Similar “land grabs” by
multinational interests (in collusion with governments), along with
other forms of governmental evictions—in violation of interdependent rights to food, shelter, and health as well as rights to property
and life—have led to comparable complaints before the African
Commission of Human Rights.11

NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2016/02/04/chinas-oppression-of-tibetans-has-dramatically-increased.
7
See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at 16 (Mar. 29,
2006).
8
Id. at 1–2.
9
Id. at 26–28, 47–49.
10
Id. at 68.
11
See, e.g., Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Communication
155/96, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n
H.P.R.], ¶¶ 1–9 (Oct. 27, 2001), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf; Malawi Afr. Ass’n v. Mauritania,
Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 17 (May 11,
2000),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/54.91-61.9196.93-98.93-164.97_196.97-210.98/achpr27_54.91_61.91_96.93_98.93_
164.97_196.97_210.98_eng.pdf. See also Olivier De Schutter, How Not to Think
of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland, 38
J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 249 (2011).
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Despite such abuses, international lawyers, including human
rights advocates, are ambivalent and sometimes hostile about recognizing a “human right” to property protection. That skepticism extends to U.S. judges. As discussed below, if Venezuela steals the
property of Mr. Mezerhane or if Paraguay deprives its own indigenous peoples of their livelihood, U.S. courts appear to be of the view
that this is not an issue governed by international law.12 This Article
explores the bases for such hostility and defends the reality (and the
idea) of the human right of property.
In doing so, this Article revisits questions that have been raised
for centuries concerning the right of property and, at least since
WWII, the role of international law with respect to that right. The
latter was a particular source of tension when the U.N. first began to
elaborate the “international bill of rights.”13 Whether to include a
reference to property became a highly contentious issue when the
U.N. General Assembly elaborated, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and much later, when that body considered
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).14 On both occasions, there was considerable dispute about whether the international community ought to include as
a “fundamental human right” a right to the protection of property.15
After a fraught battle (mostly on East-West lines), the U.N. opted to
include what ultimately became Article 17 in the Universal Declaration.16 That contested decision to include a purposely vague recognition of the “right to own property,” in an instrument regarded as
purely hortatory, came only after a series of votes on alternative formulations (including one widely supported option to omit such a
right altogether).17 Later in 1966, when the Assembly sought to
12

Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549–52
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016).
13
See John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469–71 (2014).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 471–72.
16
Id. at 472–73.
17
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17 (Dec.
10, 1948) (“1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”). See
Gudmundur Alfredsson, Article 17, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
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transform the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a binding
treaty, property rights were left on the cutting room floor. 18 Such a
right never made it into either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, the bases
for the “international bill of rights.”19 While the West, led by the
United States, was eager to protect the institution of private property, the U.S.S.R., its allies, and many newly independent states
were equally eager to defend the paramount right of sovereigns to
exercise self-determination, particularly with respect to a matter so
closely connected to a nation’s decision to be either a socialist or a
market state.20 When the two covenants affirmed, as their respective
first articles, the right of self-determination, the West’s preference
for including the right to property was the first casualty.21
Much has changed in international law since 1966 but some attitudes have not. Today, as is suggested by the list of thirty-five international instruments accompanying this Article in the Appendix,
property protections feature prominently in a number of widely ratified treaties, including all of today’s most prominent regional human rights regimes. In the wake of the Cold War—and the inclusion
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 255, 255–56 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992). Opposition to including property rights among the “rights of man” was not limited to the
U.N.’s East bloc members. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 163 (1945). Lauterpacht argued that the decision by the
Institute of International Law in 1929 to include, as the first article in its Declaration on the Rights of Man, the duty of states “to grant to every person the equal
right to life, liberty, and property” is “unobjectionable,” so long as the intention
is to require “respect on a footing of equality such rights” under national law. Id.
But he argued that “social and economic changes have intervened” to preclude
acceptance of what Locke, Blackstone, the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 had all considered an “inviolable and sacred right.” Id. Lauterpacht omitted property rights from his bill of
rights not only because of the rise of states reliant on collective ownership as the
principal means of production, but because even states dependent on private property interfered with such property “through taxation, death duties, and regulation
in pursuance of general welfare.” Id.
18
See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 470.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 471–72.
21
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), adopted
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
art. 1(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
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of property rights in nearly all of the world’s constitutions—there is
no longer a clear East-West divide on the question of whether legal
protections for property rights exist as a matter of national or international law.22 As demonstrated by a case study of the property
rights jurisprudence of the IACHR in Part III, such rights are now
the subject of international adjudication, not only by regional human
rights tribunals but by several human rights treaty bodies.23 International property rights scholarship exists with respect to a number of
the treaty regimes identified in the Appendix, particularly jurisprudence under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) relating to intellectual property,
and in investor-state tribunals under International Investment
Agreements (IIAs).24 Property rights also feature prominently in the
work and reports issued by development experts and economists.25
International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), give high salience to property
rights as part of good governance.26 Indeed, these institutions, and
others that purport to measure “rule of law” compliance, presume
that states have a duty to protect the property of both their own na-

According to a 2012 study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’
potential impact on subsequent national constitutions, 85% of the world’s constitutions contained a right to own property. Zachary Elkins et al., Imagining a
World Without the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 19, tbl.1 (Mar. 7,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2469194. See also Sprankling, supra note 13, at 493 (noting that at a
symposium in 1995, Louis Henkin, the chief Reporter for the 1986 U.S. Restatement—which did not include the right to property in its list of established customary human rights in section 702—is reported to have said that, given changes in
the world since 1986, “if he were drafting Section 702 today he would include as
customary international law [the] right[] to property”) (quoting Richard B. Lillich,
The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 n.43 (1995)).
23
See also infra Part V.
24
See infra Appendix. See also José E. Alvarez, The U.S. Contribution to
International Investment Law, in AMERICAN CLASSICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1, 30 (José E. Alvarez ed., 2017) [hereinafter
Alvarez, International Investment Law].
25
See, e.g., Harvey M. Jacobs, Private Property and Human Rights: A Mismatch in the 21st Century?, 22 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE S85, S94 (2013).
26
See id. at S94–S95.
22
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tionals and of foreign investors and traders located in their territory.27 But apart from these discrete regimes, attention to property
rights as part of international human rights law lags.28 Indeed, even
human rights defenders remain either ambivalent or overtly hostile
to the idea that international law protects property as a fundamental
human right. As a leading U.S. scholar on the subject, John Sprankling has noted, despite black letter treaty law to the contrary, the
traditional answer to the question—does a right to property exist under international law?—is “no.”29
The few contemporary scholars who have taken international
property protections seriously, such as Sprankling, have tended to
assume that the piecemeal nature of international property protections, illustrated by the absence in the accompanying Appendix of a
single overarching multilateral property protection treaty, is a problem that needs correcting.30 On this issue, as on many others, some
suggest that international law’s approach to property protection
needs harmonization.31 There is a presumption that it would be desirable to encourage the development of an “international law of
property” that would embrace a “global” human right to property
recognized as a matter of general customary international law or
general principles of law.32 Such a global right, applicable to all nations irrespective of their adherence to any treaty and perhaps
achieved through gradual case law development, would ideally result in clarity about the protected forms of both tangible and intangible property, along with global agreement on the legitimate modalities for its creation and acquisition, including uniform rights to
use, destroy, exclude, and transfer property.33 Of course, a global
27

See, e.g., Era Dabla-Norris & Scott Freeman, The Enforcement of Property
Rights and Underdevelopment 3 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/99/127, 1999),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99127.pdf.
28
But see Christophe Golay & Ioana Cismas, Legal Opinion: The Right to
Property from a Human Rights Perspective 2 (July 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635359.
29
Sprankling, supra note 13, at 465.
30
Id. at 500–02.
31
See id.; see generally Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation
of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553
(2002).
32
JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 347–60
(2014).
33
See id.
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human right to property would also contain consistent rules identifying when states can legitimately regulate or interfere with the
right.
This Article explores why there is a continuing resistance to acceptance of such a human right in many circles even though international law embraces property rights while not cohering around a
unified law of property. It also attempts to show, through select examples, what the human right of property has meant so far in practice. Part I surveys reasons for the continuing resistance to global
property rights. Part II answers the canard that the international protection of property rights is fundamentally “un-American.” Part III
provides a case study of how one regional human rights system has
dealt with the right of property. Part IV addresses, by contrast, U.S.
courts’ responses to claims based on such a human right. Part V explores, more broadly, what contemporary international law says
about the right, while Part VI advances some normative justifications for the black letter law. A final section concludes that, contrary
to advocates of defragmentation or harmonization, the human right
of property, admittedly a product of the West, will remain a viable
proposition in the West and beyond only to the extent that it remains
subject to distinct contextualized interpretations in international regimes and diverse international adjudicative forums.
I. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY PROTECTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Hostility to the idea that international law should protect a human right to property applicable to a state’s own nationals, and not
only to foreigners within it, cuts across the left-right political spectrum. While left-leaning international lawyers are sympathetic to the
claims of groups such as the Sawhoyamaxa community in Paraguay,
they are likely to see demands by indigenous peoples as special
cases involving the self-determination or the “cultural” rights of a
group—and not an instance that invokes a general human right to
property under international law.34 At the same time, critics of socialist or undemocratic regimes may recoil at the property abuses
committed by such regimes when directed at a state’s own nationals
See, e.g., Ariel E. Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became “Tribal Peoples”: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities,
15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 58–59 (2010).
34
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(such as the treatment accorded to Mr. Mezerhane) but still remain
reluctant to open the door of their own courts to claims by foreigners
or to permit supranational scrutiny of how states treat the property
rights of their own citizens.35
Human rights advocates’ ambivalence about this alleged fundamental right is deeply rooted in history.36 The right to property underlies, after all, some of the darkest episodes in history and they are
skeptical about elevating the status of a right that has impeded the
realization of what they consider “more important” human rights.37
They are aware that some theologians have used the right of property (recast as sovereign “dominium”) to justify “just war” and its
consequences, including the plunder of property owned by “infidels”38; that the “father” of international law, Hugo Grotius, used
property rights to justify the Dutch East India Company’s unilateral
rights to protect Dutch trading routes;39 and that nineteenth century
lawyers argued that the need to protect the rights of foreign investors
from the North required resort to gun-boat diplomacy and even military interventions in the Global South.40 The ostensible right to
property has privileged powerful and wealthy elites within states,41

35

See, e.g., FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 1294–95 (11th
Cir. 2001).
36
See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S86.
37
Id. at S95–96.
38
WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (Michael
Byers trans., 2000); JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–46 (2010).
39
Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile
Capitalism: Grotius to Smith, in THE ROOTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6–9
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Vincent Chetail eds., 2014).
40
See, e.g., O. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to
BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV.
L. & POL’Y 2010–2011, 649, 651 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
41
See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S95–96.
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been used to limit the right to vote,42 perpetuated patriarchy,43 promoted inequality,44 and hampered efforts to redistribute.45 Indeed,
given the concentration of wealth in the world, the right to property
would appear to be a problem to be solved rather than a right that
needs defending.46
The right to property has been charged, in short, with many sins.
It has been used as an imperialist cudgel to colonize,47 to privilege
only one kind of market state,48 and to support wrong-headed “privatization” demands by the IMF.49 Today, the most prominent international property rights regime—pursued under treaties like the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),50 which protects
the property rights of foreign investors in its three states—is seen as
chilling environmental regulations even in rich countries like Canada and the U.S.51 The fact that property rights feature so prominently in institutions like the IMF is one reason they are seen with
great suspicion by those who have long questioned the consequences of that institution’s ideologically loaded development
42

See RALPH FEVRE, INDIVIDUALISM AND INEQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF
WORK AND POLITICS 74 (2016).
43
See Kerry Rittich, The Properties of Gender Equality, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 87, 87 (Philip Alston
& Mary Robinson eds., 2005) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT].
44
See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S95–96.
45
See Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional
Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 770–71 (2003).
46
See FEVRE, supra note 42, at 1–2. It has not escaped the notice of international lawyers that the two human rights covenants’ sole mention of property targets the well-known uses of property entitlements to engage in harmful discrimination. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(1) (barring distinctions among persons “of any kind, such as . . . property, birth or other status”); ICESCR, supra
note 21, art. 2(2) (same).
47
See Jacobs, supra note 25, at S87.
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., Ukraine Receives IMF Support But Must Accelerate Reforms,
IMF Country Focus (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/03/na040417-ukraine-receives-imf-support-but-must-accelerate-reforms.
50
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
51
See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International
“Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 32 (2003).
See generally Jacobs, supra note 25, at S85–99.
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agenda, including experts on human rights or transitional justice. If
one’s view of what international property rights mean is dominated
by its role in investor-state arbitrations or in the conditionality agendas of the IMF—regimes that are now subject to considerable backlash—there is no mystery surrounding resistance to such rights.52 To
the extent internationalized property protections are seen as the
product of discredited formulas to promote economic development
in less developed states, these are likely to suffer the same criticisms
as the Washington Consensus (or post-Washington Consensus)
frames for justifying them.53
Resistance to an individual “right” to property protection is not
limited to modern day skeptics of economic globalization.54 It has
deeper roots in conceptual and moral contradictions that have been
obvious to legal philosophers for centuries.55 How can persons simultaneously be protected from government for a right that exists only
because it is created by government? Why protect private property,
a creature of society, from society, when society needs at times to
take property without full compensation, as with land reform?56 For

52
See, e.g., Letter from Alliance for Justice, to Members of Congress (Mar.
11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf
(letter signed by 100 U.S. law professors urging Congress to reject investor-state
dispute settlement provisions in order “to protect the rule of law” as trade agreements are negotiated).
53
See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Why are We “Re-Calibrating” Our Investment
Treaties?, 4 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REV. 143, 144 (2010) [hereinafter Alvarez, Our Investment Treaties].
54
See, e.g., PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R.
Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith, eds., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1840).
55
See id.; see also Rhonda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reconsidering the Right to
Own Property, 12 J. HUM. RTS. 180, 182 (2013).
56
See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 163. These tensions emerge
even in documents that affirm official long-standing U.S. policy affirming the illegality of government takings of foreign owned property. Thus, the influential
Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, whose chief reporter was Louis
Henkin, affirms that states are responsible for injury to nationals of other states,
including for acts or omissions that violate their right to property. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711 (AM.
LAW INST. 1986). It also acknowledges that while there is lack of agreement on
the scope of the right, “the right of an individual to own some property and not to
be deprived of it arbitrarily is recognized as a human right.” Id., cmt. d. Nonetheless, it acknowledges that states other than the U.S. have frequently asserted an
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many it is hard to take seriously a right whose limitation may be
necessary—even vital—to give effect to the rights of others or
whose essence (the right to sell, trade or destroy one’s property)
seems at odds with the inalienability that for some distinguishes
“genuine” civil and political rights.57 While we would be aghast by
the idea that someone should be able to bargain away his right not
to be tortured, it would be a feeble property right that does not include the rights to sell, trade or destroy it.
As this suggests, skepticism about a right to property is not limited to international lawyers. For some legal philosophers, the alleged right to property does not derive from the human condition but
rather from the mere material (and arbitrary) fact that someone has
managed to secure first possession.58 Other critics argue that the purported right is largely a claim made against the state and has little to
say about the most important consequence of recognizing such a
right: namely, that it diminishes the rights of other persons by excluding them from possession.59 The right to property largely consists, after all, in the right to exclude others from enjoying one’s
property. Recognition of such a “right” limits the freedom of others
since it imposes a duty on them to abstain from interfering with it.60
If one defines “genuine” human rights61 as those that serve to connect individuals by reminding them of their common humanity,
exception from compensation in cases involving a national program of agricultural land reform which would not be possible if full compensation were to be
paid. Id. § 712 reporter’s note 3.
57
See, e.g., Francis Cheneval, Property Rights as Human Rights, in 1
REALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS 11 (Hernando de Soto & Francis Cheneval eds.,
2006); LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 3 (1990).
58
See Manuel Monteagudo, The Right to Property in Human Rights and Investment Law: A Latin American Perspective of an Unavoidable Connection 6,
n.26 (SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project Working Paper Series No.
2013/06, 2013) (citing Héctor Faúndez Ledesma). For a thoughtful critique of efforts to justify private property on theories of historic entitlement, see JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 253–83 (1988).
59
For an effort to square this circle, see HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:
VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–40 (2011).
60
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 217, 220 (Rowan Cruft et al.
eds., 2015) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (noting that this is characteristic of all rights).
61
Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 6 (discussing whether the right to property
is a “genuine” human right).
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property rights appear to do the opposite. Encouraging people, like
children, to claim—“that’s mine”—does not seem, at first glance, a
particularly promising way to encourage individuals to relate to one
another. Why protect a right, in short, that, as the Ten Commandments suggest, is largely defined by the right to exclude others from
what is one’s own?62
As this suggests, religious leaders have not generally (or always)
been strong proponents of property rights, particularly if these are
seen as individual rights to private property.63 Christian theologians
have long struggled with the moral justifications for allocating private property.64 Many of them have pointed out that, since man—
not God—created the institution of private property and God’s earth
was created for the use and enjoyment of all, there needs to be a
particular justification offered for privileging a right that allocates
particular objects or pieces of land to individuals to use as they
please to the exclusion of others who may have a greater need.65
Other theologians have struggled with the moral justifications of a
right they associated with several of the deadly sins—from avarice
to gluttony.66 And those with a sense of history have questioned the
need to elevate to the status of a “right” a concept that has justified
slavery and is still used around the world to subjugate the rights of
women.67 Why privilege a bundle of rights, including inheritance,
“You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you shall not covet your
neighbor’s wife or his male servant or his female servant or his ox or his donkey
or anything that belongs to your neighbor.” Exodus 20:17. For general critiques
of the right to property along these lines, see Laura Dehaibi, The Case for an
Inclusive Human Right to Property: Social Importance and Individual Self-Realization, 6 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2015).
63
See, e.g., Louis W. Hensler III, What’s Sic Utere for the Goose: The Public
Nature of the Right to Use and Enjoy Property Suggests a Utilitarian Approach
to Nuisance Cases, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 31, 36 (2010).
64
See id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 37.
67
See, e.g., Exodus, supra note 62, or, for that matter, JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 221 (G.D. H. Cole ed., J.M.
Dent & Sons 1913) (1755) (“[They] bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new
powers to the rich . . . irretrievably [they] destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed
the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable
right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind
to perpetual labour, slavery, and wretchedness.”).
62
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which perpetuates the accumulation of wealth—and which only
makes it harder, as Jesus suggested, for rich men (property holders
have historically been predominately male) to get into Heaven?68
Indeed, even defenders of private property, such as John Locke, argued that persons should not possess more property than they could
use or suggested, as did Rousseau, that the right to one’s personal
property does not include the right to make a profit from it.69 Many
prominent scholars have treated property as a form of theft, have
called for its abolition, have seen it as a manifestation of pernicious
possessive individualism, or have associated it with violence pursued for the sake of dispossession.70
And even defenders of national property rights have been skeptical of the need for supra-national scrutiny in furtherance of such
rights. For example, U.S. property scholars have been critical of the
need for international rules to protect the rights of those whose rights
are already subject to the considerable protections accorded under
relevant U.S. law, including the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.71 For many such critics, international property rights, such as
those that accompany the investment chapter of NAFTA, have become more like swords wielded by powerful foreign investors to
challenge legitimate regulation and less like shields against the
abuse of state power.72 Critics allege that IIAs, originally touted as
Matthew 19:24 (“[I]t is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle,
than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” (quoting Jesus). Thus, even
John Locke, a foremost defender of rights to private property, took contradictory
positions regarding the “natural rights” of heirs to their inheritance. See
WALDRON, supra note 58, at 241–51.
69
See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 182 (“As much land as a
man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much [only]
is his property.”) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 308
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690)); ROUSSEAU, supra note
67, at 50–51.
70
See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 182 (citing PIERRE JOSEPH
PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND
OF GOVERNMENT (1840); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO (Samuel H. Beer et al eds., 1955) (1888); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962));
Stefan Andreasson, Stand and Deliver: Private Property and the Politics of
Global Dispossession, 54 POL. STUD. 3 (2006)).
71
See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 51, at 59.
72
See id. at 40.
68
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tools to promote the rule of law, have become mechanisms to undermine it.73
Others, particularly on the right, laud defenders of private property––from Robert Nozick to Friedrich Hayek––but insist that decisions on how a government chooses to treat the property of its own
citizens should not be subject to the dictates of international adjudicators. Some of the populist resistance to the European Union undoubtedly stems from resentments generated by property-restricting
mandates issued from Brussels and enforced by the European Court
of Justice.74 In the United States, for self-described members of the
“Alt-Right,” the fact that many human rights treaties identified in
the Appendix purport to intrude on “sovereign” rights to allocate
property rights is yet one more reason for opposing such treaties as
inconsistent with “American values.”
Outside of Western countries like the United States, hostility to
the internationalization of property rights has a long history that extends as far back as attempts to establish a “New International Economic Order” in the 1970s.75 It is not lost on critical scholars of international law that the idea of protecting property on the basis of
international norms first arose in connection with protecting the
rights of (Western) foreign investors.76 For some scholars associated
with Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), those
73

See Letter from Alliance for Justice, supra note 52. For some U.S. critics,
the property protections in the international investment regime are reminiscent of
discredited property protections imposed under the Lochner era as described in,
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE & DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 19–22 (1993).
74
Indeed, the very first property rights case brought to the European Court of
Justice was a challenge brought by a German farmer who was precluded from
planting new wine vines by an E.U. edict that precluded use of her land for this
purpose to maintain a “quantitative balance” of the market in wine. The farmer
lost the case on the basis that the restriction was not an “undue limitation upon the
exercise of the right to property.” Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3748–49.
75
James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1996, 2032 n.116 (2000).
76
For example, see, Ursula Kriebaum & August Reinisch, Property, Right
to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYC. OF PUB. INT’L L. (Rüdiger
Wolfrum ed., 2009) (noting that international investment law has served as a backbone for international rules on the protection of private property).
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historical origins continue to dominate, and therefore, the contemporary property rights instruments identified in the Appendix constitute struts supporting the “structural violence” of racialized privilege and embedded asymmetries that international law continues to
impose on the formerly colonized.77 To such critics, the human right
to property perpetuates “Westernised legal modernities of individualised property rights and land designation titles.”78 As this suggests,
arguments first heard at the U.N. in 1948 and 1966—that each nation should be able to determine for itself when to create alternatives
to private property, including common property (e.g. national parks)
or communal property (such as communal lands governed by a
tribe)—continue to be made today.79 Then, as now, many see the
idea of an international human right to property protection as fundamentally incompatible with the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on interference with states’ domestic jurisdiction or its recognition that
every state enjoys the right to self-determination.80
Finally, even those who might be willing to concede that property rights should ideally be recognized at the national and international levels differ considerably as to the nature of the “right” in
question. Both defenders and detractors of the human right to property in the United States tend to see it as an individualized right to
secure compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.81 To the extent they consider them at all, they see internationalized property rights as demanding freedom from state interference.82 But even European states equally disposed to protecting private property as a constitutional right have not seen such rights in
77

See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in
the Twenty-First Century, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 17, 27–28 (2012).
78
Phanuel Kaapama, The Enduring Colonial Legacies of Land Dispossessions and the Evolving Property Rights Legal Discourse: Whither Transitional
Justice?, 11 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 108, 112 (2017). See generally Gathii, supra note 75, at 2027.
79
See, e.g., Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 181–82.
80
Indeed, the Calvo Doctrine – which opposed the idea that an international
minimum standard of treatment protects the property rights of foreigners – was
grounded in Latin American apprehension of external pressures that affront selfdetermination. See, e.g., Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 6–7 nn.29–30.
81
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION:
THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 347 (2014).
82
See id.
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quite the same way.83 Property rights in places like Germany are
associated with both positive duties on states as well as negative obligations not to impose harm.84 Others, including the IACtHR (as
discussed in Part III), have seen the protection of property as a species of economic, social, and cultural rights that imposes duties on
governments to respect, protect, and fulfill certain basic needs beyond merely providing a social safety net.85 For these and other reasons, many on the left and the right, in the East and the West, think
that the idea of a global right to property is so deeply contested that
it cannot be the subject of international rule. On this view, property
protection surely cannot be a “fundamental,” genuinely universal
state obligation—and therefore cannot be a “human” right.
II. INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AS AN “AMERICAN”
IDEA
It hardly needs be said that respect for property rights is deeply
ingrained in the American DNA—and its law. As scholars on the
U.S. founding have noted, it is likely that only rhetorical elegance
prevented Thomas Jefferson from proclaiming, in the Declaration of
Independence, that the “pursuit of happiness” includes, most prominently, the pursuit and protection of property.86 The contemporary
Virginia Declaration of Rights had proclaimed, after all, that all have
“inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot . . . deprive or divest their posterity . . . “ including “the
means of acquiring and possessing property . . . .”87 Neither of these
declarations confine their “inalienable rights” by nationality. Like
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,
they consider rights to property as extending to all persons as human
beings irrespective of nationality or other status.88
83

See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 775.
Id. at 733, 742 (noting that the concept of the Sozialstaat embraces duties
on the state to redistribute wealth and not only individual rights against state
abuse).
85
See, e.g., Golay & Cismas, supra note 28, at 2, 28–29.
86
See Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of the Pursuit of Happiness, 7 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 195, 197–99 (2015).
87
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776).
88
See DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789
[DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN], art. 2 (“Le but
84
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Despite the clear universal implications of such documents, a
common view in the United States is that such property protections
are our own, designed to protect our nationals, perhaps even when
they reside or invest abroad, and are thus not conferred by international law. This is historically inaccurate.89 While the U.S. Framers
were careful to embed individual property rights directly into the
U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights—in its takings, contract, due
process, and equal protection clauses—and U.S. judges eventually
required individual states of the Union to respect such rights for all
those residing in the country, from the start the Framers saw property rights as having international repercussions and dimensions.90
As scholars of the founding period have pointed out, those who
established the Republic revered the merchants’ chapter of the
Magna Carta which had proclaimed that
[a]ll merchants shall have safe and secure exit from
England, and entry to England, with the right to tarry
there and to move about as well by land as by water,
for buying and selling by the ancient and right customs, quit from all evil tolls, except (in time of war)
such merchants as are of the land at war with us.91
While it would be anachronistic to describe the English noblemen of 1215 behind the merchants’ chapter as the equivalent of to-

de toute association politique est la conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l’Homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté, et la résistance à l’oppression.” [“The aim of all political association is the preservation
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of Man. These rights are liberty, property,
security, and resistance to oppression.”]), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droitfrancais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de1789.
89
See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional
Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003).
90
See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934–35 (2010).
91
MAGNA CARTA ch. 41 (1215).
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day’s “free traders” in their attitudes, the Founders were deeply influenced by them.92 They saw the rights to private property as embedded in the English common law imported to the colonies and saw
the mother country’s failure to respect it as a betrayal justifying revolution and eventually independence. As is also well known, the
Founders, including James Madison, followed John Locke in proclaiming that “[g]overnment is instituted no less for the protection
of the property than of the persons of individuals.”93 Given these
views, it is no surprise that they sought to convince foreign governments that the fledging U.S. Republic would respect the laws of nations, including, as the Golden Rule demands, customary norms to
protect the property rights of all.94 As legal historians have documented, the founding documents of the United States—from its
Constitution to its first treaties with Great Britain—were intended to
speak to a foreign as well as a domestic audience.95 These instruments emphasized that the United States, like other nations worthy
of international legitimacy, would respect both national and foreign
owned property.
From the start, America’s infatuation with property rights did
not stop at its border. The Founders, particularly Alexander Hamilton, argued that international law, and not only U.S. law, required
extending the property rights protections enjoyed by U.S. citizens
under the Constitution even to British “traitors” whose contract and
property rights were violated by state courts in the United States in
the wake of the revolutionary war.96 Accordingly, thanks largely to
92
See José E. Alvarez, Alexander Hamilton’s Defense of Foreign Capital 4
(N.Y.U. Law IILJ MegaReg Forum Paper 2017/1), http://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Alvarez_IILJ-MegaRegForumPaper_20171.pdf [hereinafter Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital].
93
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 313 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009)
(1788) (echoing LOCKE, supra note 69, at 368–69 (“The great and chief end . . .
of men’s uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.”).
94
See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 4.
95
See Golove & Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation, supra note 90, at 934–35.
96
See, e.g., Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 8–9. See
also Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8. In The Defence,
Hamilton did not distinguish the contract rights of foreigners from their rights
against government takings of property even though, at the time, the U.S.
Constitution barred states from impeding contract rights but the federal takings
clause had not yet been extended to the states.
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Hamilton’s efforts—whose instructions deeply influenced the
United States’ negotiator, John Jay—George Washington’s first
treaty, the 1794 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States (otherwise known as the
“Jay Treaty”) included recognition of the substantive rights owed to
British investors and creditors.97 The Jay Treaty also established a
mixed claims arbitral commission to settle claims of property rights
deprivations.98
At a time when the Jay Treaty was being passionately denounced
and Jay was being burned in effigy in several U.S. cities for negotiating a treaty that was as unpopular then as trade agreements appear
to be today, Hamilton, became its “undisputed champion.” 99 Hamilton and an ally wrote twenty-eight erudite essays, nearly 100,000
words, defending sequentially the Treaty’s twenty-eight articles,100
entitled The Defence.101 The principal arguments arrayed against the
Jay Treaty by its critics were that Jay had concluded a wildly unequal and possibly unconstitutional agreement that undercut U.S.
sovereignty and fundamental U.S. national interests—all while undemocratically allocating important adjudicative decisions to arbitrators instead of Article III judges.102 Hamilton responded that the
terms of the Jay Treaty were not only in the national interests of the
new republic, but also the best alternative to renewed conflict or
war.103 Hamilton’s defense was equal parts law and policy. He argued that everything in the treaty was supported by the Constitution,
fulfilled pledges made in the Treaty of Peace that had ended the revolutionary war, and had the backing of the law of nations.104 Turning
to international arbitration was necessary, Hamilton argued, because
97

See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 487–500 (2004); Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 4–6.
98
Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 10.
99
CHERNOW, supra note 97, at 496.
100
Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 2.
101
For a text of The Defence, see generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 5 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (Hamilton,
writing as “Camillus,” a wise Roman general who, according to Plutarch’s Lives,
was sorely misunderstood by his people, wrote nos. I–XXII, XXXI–XXXIII, and
XXXVI–XXXVIII; Rufus King, a federalist ally of Hamilton, wrote under Hamilton’s supervision, nos. XXIII-XXX and XXXIV–XXXV).
102
Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 3.
103
HAMILTON, supra note 101, at 213.
104
Id. at 158–60.
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the courts of neither Britain nor the U.S. could be trusted to address
those claims impartially.105
Hamilton appealed to morality as well as pragmatism to defend
the need to protect private property even when owned by foreigners.106 “No powers of language at my command[,]” he stated, “can
express the abhorrence I feel at the idea of violating the property of
individuals . . . .”107 Although the law of nations accepted that a nation was free to determine for itself whether to permit foreigners to
bring property into or acquire property in its territory, once it did so,
it had a “duty . . . to protect that property, and to secure to the owner
the full enjoyment of it” as “it tacitly promises protection and security.”108 Anything else is “inconsistent with the notion of property[,]” as it would violate the “contract between the society and the
individual” ensuring that the latter retains his property and its use.109
“The property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permission of its laws, may justly be regarded as a deposit, of which the
society is the trustee.”110 A violation of that trust would be an act of
“perfidious rapacity,” offensive to “moral feeling” and its perpetrator would deserve “all the opprobrium and infamy of violated
faith.”111 The sixth article of Jay’s Treaty permitting compensation
to British creditors for their losses and damages notwithstanding
state laws that made it impossible for them to collect on these debts
wiped away what Hamilton called a stain on the “honor and character of the country” and was required by morality, natural justice, and
the “spirit and principles of good government . . . .”112 Respecting
this public pledge and renouncing recourse to such sequestrations in
the future were a “valuable pledge for the more strict future observance of our public engagements . . . .”113 Doing anything else
would sanction “the power of committing fraud, of violating the

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 348.
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public faith, of sacrificing the principles of commerce, [and] of prostrating credit.”114 “To Hamilton, protecting a nation’s reputation for
respecting private rights of property under the rule of law was vital
to ensuring incoming flows of capital.”115 Even temporary suspensions of the exercise of foreigners’ property rights could not be justified for “extraordinary and great emergencies[,]” because any such
exception, “if conceived to exist, would be, at least, a slow poison,
conducing to a sickly habit of commerce . . . .”116
Hamilton’s The Defence is the first in a long line of significant
policy speeches, adjudicative innovations, and treaties, initiated by
virtually every U.S. President in the modern era and designed to protect foreign capital both here and abroad through various tools of
national and international law.117 There is a remarkable continuity
with respect to these matters across Democratic and Republican administrations.118 The Jay Treaty planted the seed for what would
eventually become U.S. post-WWII treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs)119 with significant property protections for their respective parties—treaties which eventually led to
contemporary bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters
in today’s free trade agreements (such as Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA).120
Given the fact the United States has been, for much of its history,
the world’s greatest importer and exporter of capital, it should surprise no one that it has long used the tools of international law to
protect such capital flows. This policy has been pursued through, for
example, sixty-five international claims commissions established
over the two centuries since the Jay Treaty, as well as through U.S.
114

Id. at 410.
Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 5.
116
HAMILTON, supra note 101, at 445.
117
See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 20, 63. See
also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
U.S. POSTWAR FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 48 (2017).
118
See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 63.
119
See José E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 19 (1989) [hereinafter Alvarez, Political Protectionism].
120
See José E. Alvarez, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Investment Chapter
the New ‘Gold Standard’?, 47 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 503, 503
(2016).
115
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diplomatic efforts to undermine the Calvo Doctrine (which tried to
affirm that only national law determines the treatment of foreign
capital) in the nineteenth century.121 By the mid-twentieth century,
U.S. friendship, commerce and navigation treaties after WWII,
which served to export Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, and
repeated affirmations by U.S. secretaries of state (starting with Cordell Hull) expressed the view that expropriations directed against
U.S. citizens abroad require “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation.122 Eventually, by the 1970s, U.S. government opposition
at the U.N. to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO)
went so far as to include U.S. legislation precluding aid to nations
that resort to expropriations without compensation (as anticipated
by the NIEO).123 Further, from the mid-1980s through at least the
Obama Administration,124 America resorted to investor state arbitration to protect foreign investor rights in BITs125 and investment
chapters within FTAs (including Chapter Eleven of NAFTA).126
Consistent with Hamilton’s admonitions in The Defence, the U.S.
has always sought to protect private property, even in cases of war
and national emergency.127 U.S. leaders presumed that the same
Lockean social contract struck between a government and the governed to protect the property of citizens has been struck among at
least some nations through treaties that extend to such protections to
foreign-owned property once it is permitted to enter the country.128
U.S. officials have always argued, as did Hamilton, that protecting
national and foreign capital helps to ensure more of both.129 Their
efforts to use FCNs (and eventually BITs and FTAs) to protect such
121

See Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 1–10, 70–71.
Id.
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Id.
124
See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8.
125
See Johnson & Gimblett, supra note 40, at 685–90.
126
See Alvarez, Political Protectionism, supra note 119, at 139. For an overview of Jay Treaty’s contribution to arbitration, see Charles H. Brower II, Arbitration, MAX PLANCK ENCYC. OF PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/
home/EPIL (last updated Feb. 2007) (type “arbitration” in search bar and follow
“Arbitration” hyperlink).
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See, e.g., Alvarez, Political Protectionism, supra note 119, at 136; Alvarez,
International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 67.
128
Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 62–63.
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See id. at 65; Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 5–6,
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rights was seen by U.S. negotiators as an effort to export the protections accorded by U.S. law to the world; that is, an effort to elevate
the standards of property protections extended to one’s nationals to
foreign investors located in one’s territory.130
Of course, the idea that everyone’s right to property requires respect because it is essential for a nation’s people to live peacefully
in common, because it enables sovereigns to engage with one another, and because it provides a suitable base for a common law
among nations—jus gentium—were not justifications newly minted
by the U.S. Founders. The framers of the U.S. Constitution and the
Jay Treaty drew on the intellectual heritage forged by Western forebears of property rights writ large, including Aristotle, Aquinas,
Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Hugo Grotius, Adam Smith,
and John Locke.131 Hamilton’s thoughts on the value of property
derived in no small part from those of the Scholastics, for example.
The Dominican friars of Salamanca, Francisco de Victoria and Domingo de Soto, borrowed ideas from Aristotle and Aquinas to provide a Christian justification for private property and its protection.132 Long before Hamilton, they argued that even though God
originally created shared or communal property, after the Fall when
humans came to associate in society, natural law compelled the establishment of private property because this made everyone more
diligent, enabled human affairs to be conducted in a more reliable
way, and the rise of commerce made peace more likely.133 There is
a direct line between that Salamanca school and the “father of international law,” Hugo Grotius, which continues through the more secular arguments of enlightenment thinkers like Locke, Adam Smith,
and avid absorbers of this heritage like Hamilton.134
Those who suggest that Judeo-Christian civilization is undermined by globalization and property respecting pacts that facilitate
130

See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 502 (1998).
131
See generally WALDRON, supra note 58, at 6–7, 242.
132
See Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 5–6 (2011).
133
Id. at 16.
134
Id. at 7, 26, 30; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Sovereignty, Property and
Empire: Early Modern English Contexts, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355, 383
(2017).
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it should remember that the forebears of Judeo-Christian ethics provided the intellectual firepower that enabled and justified private
property institutions to emerge, along with the institutions that internationalized it, such as lex mercatoria, international banking, organizations to enable global trade and capital flows, and, as the Jay
Treaty and its successors illustrate, international adjudicative mechanisms to settle property disputes with a transnational dimension.135
Those who criticize the internationalization of property rights as
creatures of (predominately Western) notions of mercantile capitalism are therefore not wrong. There is little question that international law, long before Jeremy Bentham coined the term, 136 has
served to grease the wheels of global capitalism, not least by elevating the status of private property from an individual right to a sovereign right over territory137—and that many of the contemporary
instruments listed in the Appendix reflect increasing reliance on
Western legal frameworks that Lauterpacht, back in 1945, argued
were undermined by modernity.138
For centuries, Western scholars and policymakers have justified
the right to property on the basis that it advances efficiency, promotes stability, and is conducive to peace within and between nations. After 1989, those assumptions, flawed or seriously incomplete
as they may be, have underpinned liberal aspirations to “reform the
world”139—as well as many of the property regimes in the Appendix. But, as the next part illustrates, human rights regimes, including
the regional systems that incorporate a right of property, have been
subject to their own evolution over time. As Part III shows, the property jurisprudence of the IACtHR does not replicate U.S. takings
law; the American Convention of Human Rights’ inclusion of the
135

Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 8–9.
See M. W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International
Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408 (1984).
137
See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 467 (“A fundamental precept of international law is that each nation has sovereignty over its own territory.”) (footnote
omitted).
138
See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 163.
139
GUY FITI SINCLAIR, TO REFORM THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN STATES 13–20 (2017) (historical
survey of de facto constitutional transformations through changes in the operation
of U.N. peacekeeping, the turn to ILO technical assistance, and World Bank
“good governance” efforts).
136
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right to property140 has not simply exported U.S. takings jurisprudence to the Western hemisphere and the same appears to be the
case with respect to the other human rights instruments that incorporate property rights in the Appendix. The complex international
regimes extending property protections to citizens of the world today may have been inspired by Western ideas but, as is suggested
by the case study in Part III, have taken distinct forms and continue
to evolve.
III. CASE STUDY OF THE PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) provides
one gateway to understanding how contemporary international law
handles the human right of property—and the many critiques that
have accompanied that right. To be sure, the European Court of Human Rights has handled more property claims than has the IACtHR.141 But European property rights jurisprudence, including that
produced by the European Court of Justice, the product of considerable scholarship, requires no summary here.142 The international
property jurisprudence of our own hemisphere is ironically, less well
known—and in some respects, more enlightening to those seeking
140

Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR].
141
The ECtHR was established in 1959 under Article 19 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Twenty years later, in 1979,
the IACtHR was created by the ACHR, supra note 140.
142
See, e.g., Georg Ress, Reflections on the Protection of Property under the
European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND
THE RULE OF LAW 625, 625 (Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007); Mar
Aguilera Vaqués, Right of Property and Limits on its Regulation (Additional Protocol No. 1, Article 1), in EUROPE OF RIGHTS: A COMPENDIUM ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 537, 537 (Javier García Roca & Pablo Santolaya
eds., 2012); Florian Becker, Market Regulation and the ‘Right to Property’ in the
European Economic Constitution, 26 Y.B. EUROPEAN L. 265, 265–68 (P. Eeckhout & T. Tridimas eds., 2008). Indeed, the fact that, according to the latest figures
produced by the ECtHR, one in six rulings of that Court deal with property rights
accounts in part for the considerable scholarship on point. See EUR. CT. H.R.,
OVERVIEW 1959–2016 9 (2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592016_ENG.pdf [hereinafter ECTHR OVERVIEW].
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to understand the complexities of today’s internationalized right of
property.
The first part below addresses how the IACtHR handled the
Saxhoyamaxa Community’s claim, mentioned at the outset of this
Article, as well as six other rulings of that Court issued through April
of 2017, raising rights to communal property. The second part canvasses the eighteen claims in which the IACtHR has addressed the
merits of alleged violations of private property.143
A. Recognizing the Communal Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The IACtHR has considered seven cases in which a violation of
Article 21 was found in relation to communal, and not individual
property.144 In the course of these decisions, that Court has expanded
the protections accorded under that provision by (1) interpreting that
Article to include not only individual, but also communal property;
(2) developing requirements for communities to enjoy these entitlements; (3) elaborating the obligations of states regarding such communal rights; and (4) indicating ways to balance the rights of states
vis-à-vis the communities asserting such rights. These innovations
are considered in turn.
1. SECURING COMMUNAL PROPERTY
In the seminal 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
case, the Court acknowledged that “[a]mong indigenous peoples
there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of
143
These numbers were distilled from the decisions available in the database
elaborated by the Court and the Supreme Court of Mexico, available at BDJH:
Sistema Interamericano (BDJH: Interamerican System) http://www.bjdh.org.mx/
interamericano (enter search terms “derecho a la propiedad privada” and “Articulo 21”) (only in Spanish). The total number of property claims is small relative
to the 187 rulings issued by the IACtHR during this period. The eighteen rulings
involving non-communal property rights were identified through a search in that
database for decisions containing the words “right to property” and “Article 21.”
Decisions in which property claims were dismissed prior to consideration of the
merits, e.g. based on procedural grounds, are not included in these figures.
144
ACHR, supra note 140, art. 21 (“1. Everyone has the right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment in
the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and
in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other
form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.”).
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collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the
land is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and its
community.”145 It later clarified that this “notion of ownership and
possession of land does not necessarily conform to the classic concept of property, but [it still] deserves equal protection under Article
21 of the American Convention.”146 In the Sawhoyamaxa case, the
Court elaborated on why communal rights needed to be extended
protection:
Disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment
of property, springing from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using
and disposing of property, which, in turn, would render protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of persons.147
The Court has justified this interpretation first on the basis of
negotiating history and plain meaning, noting that the preparatory
works of the American Convention suggest that every sort of property right was purported to be included within the purview of Article
21.148 Second, the Court has justified its interpretation on the basis
that “human rights treaties are live instruments whose interpretation
must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to current
living conditions.”149 Third, the Court has referred to Article 29(b)
of the Convention, which states that no provision may be interpreted
as “restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom rec-

145

Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001).
146
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006).
147
Id.
148
Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 145 (noting, among other
things, that the drafters decided to refer to the “use and enjoyment of his property”
instead of “private property”).
149
Id. ¶ 146 (footnote omitted). In the 2005 Yakye Axa case, the Court linked
this resource explicitly to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 125 (June 17, 2005).
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ognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.”150 Finally, the Court has relied on the need for systemic interpretation of
treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.151 Accordingly, the IACtHR has interpreted Article 21 in light of ILO
Convention No. 169,152 the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, as well as interpretations issued by relevant interpretive bodies of all of these
instruments.153
2. DETERMINING WHETHER A GROUP ENJOYS SUCH RIGHTS
The Court has identified two principles that should be taken into
account when interpreting the requirements for a community to have
a claim under Article 21. The first principle is the community’s relation to the land. As the Court put it in the 2001 Mayagna (Sumo)
Awas Tingni Community case:
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous
communities, relations to the land are not merely a
matter of possession and production but a material
150

Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 147.
See, e.g., Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 126 (noting
that the “interpretation of a treaty should take into account not only the agreements
and documents directly related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention), but also the system of which it is a part (paragraph three of Article
31 of said Convention)”).
152
Id. ¶¶ 127–30.
153
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 93–95 (Nov.
28, 2007) (noting that while Suriname had not ratified ILO Convention No. 169
or recognized a right to communal land under its domestic law, the ICESCR committee had interpreted the right of self-determination included in that convention
as being applicable to indigenous peoples, while the ICCPR committee had interpreted Article 27 of that convention as requiring minorities not to be denied the
right, in community with other members of the same group, to enjoy their culture
which may consist of a way of life closely associated with territory and use of
resources).
151
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and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy,
even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it
to future generations.154
The second principle is the need to protect a people’s natural
resources. In Sarayaku, the Court said the following:
Given this intrinsic connection that indigenous and
tribal peoples have with their territory, the protection
of property rights and the use and enjoyment thereof
is necessary to ensure their survival. In other words,
the right to use and enjoy the territory would be
meaningless for indigenous and tribal communities
if that right were not connected to the protection of
natural resources in the territory. Therefore, the protection of the territories of indigenous and tribal peoples also stems from the need to guarantee the security and continuity of their control and use of natural
resources, which in turn allows them to maintain
their way of living. This connection between the territory and the natural resources that indigenous and
tribal peoples have traditionally used and that are
necessary for their physical and cultural survival and
the development and continuation of their worldview
must be protected under Article 21 of the Convention
to ensure that they can continue their traditional way
of living, and that their distinctive cultural identity,
social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs
and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by the States.155

154

Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149. See also, e.g., Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 133 (June 15, 2005); Yakye Axa,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 137.
155
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 146 (June 27, 2012) (citing
Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 124, 135, 137; Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118, 121 (Mar. 29, 2006)).
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In giving effect to these two principles, the Court has concluded
that a community need not have been indigenous to the land in the
sense of being its first occupiers,156 and that the group seeking to
demonstrate the necessary customary connection to the land need
not have a formal title over the property to deserve protection. Possession, as determined by customary practices, suffices. 157 As the
Court indicated in the Saxhoyamaxa case:
1) traditional possession of their lands by indigenous
people has equivalent effects to those of a stategranted full property title; 2) traditional possession
entitles indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of property title; 3) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left
their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof,
maintain property rights thereto, even though they
lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully
transferred to third parties in good faith; and 4) the
members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands
have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain
other lands of equal extension and quality.158
Moreover the IACtHR has concluded that the right to communal
lands can be claimed indefinitely into the future, for as long as the
relationship with the land lasts, and notwithstanding hindrances that
prevent its exercise. 159 The Court has also clarified that states are
not excused from fulfilling such communal rights by claiming that
156
157

Moiwana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶¶ 132–33.
Id. ¶¶ 130–31; see also Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶

151.
158

Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128. See also Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 109 (Aug. 24, 2010).
159
Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 131–32. See also
Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 113 (noting that this connection can be expressed through traditional presence or use, by means of spiritual
or ceremonial ties, sporadic settlements or crops, hunting, fishing or seasonal or
nomadic gathering, use of natural resources related to indigenous customs, or any
other element characteristic of their culture).
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the land tenure system that is in effect for the indigenous group is
unclear; lack of clarity is not itself an “insurmountable obstacle” but
requires a state to consult with the members of the group.160 Finally,
the Court has explained that the community’s right extends over
their own territory, not that of their ancestors.161
3. STATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE COMMUNAL RIGHTS ARE
ESTABLISHED
Once a communal right to property exists, states have “a positive
obligation to adopt special measures that guarantee members of indigenous and tribal peoples the full and equal exercise of their right
to the territories they have traditionally used and occupied.”162 This
obligation includes taking steps to ensure that such right is guaranteed; merely offering the possibility of judicial remedies should
breaches occur is not sufficient to comply with Article 21. 163 Required steps include first, an obligation to delimit the land owned by
the community, after engaging in consultation with community
members.164 Second, the state must
abstain from carrying out, until that delimitation, demarcation, and titling have been done, actions that
might lead the agents of the State itself, or third parties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to
affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the
property located in the geographical area where the
members of the Community live and carry out their
activities.165

160

Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 101 (Nov. 28,
2007).
161
Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 95.
162
Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 91.
163
See id. ¶ 115.
164
See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 31,
2001); Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 115.
165
Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153.
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Third, the state must provide the community with a title and not
merely extend a “privilege” to use the land.166
Finally, the communal right to property must be appropriately
balanced against any individual right to property that might be in
play. In balancing the rights to property of an indigenous community
with the rights to private property held by individuals or corporations, the IACtHR has emphasized that the former rights need not
always prevail, but that it is important to keep in mind that the ancestral rights of members of indigenous communities “could affect
other basic rights, such as the right to cultural identity and to the
very survival” of that community.167 The Court has noted that restricting
the right of private individuals to private property
might be necessary to attain the collective objective
of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and
pluralist society, in the sense given to this by the
American Convention; and it could be proportional,
if fair compensation is paid to those affected pursuant to Article 21(2) of the Convention.168
The Court has also noted that striking the appropriate balance needs
to involve, consistent with ILO Convention No. 169, consulting the
indigenous communities involved “in accordance with their own
mechanism of consultation, values, customs and customary law.”169
In the case involving the Sawhoyamaxa Community, the core of
the complaint relied on the American Convention’s Article 21. The
IACtHR ruled that the Saxhoyamaxa’s traditional possession of
tribal lands could be treated as the functional equivalent to that of “a
state-granted full property title” that entitled the tribe to restitution
and that Paraguay’s actions fell short of its obligations.170 In doing
Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 115 (noting that “title
must be recognized and respected, not only in practice, but also in law, in order
to ensure its legal certainty”).
167
Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 31, 2005).
168
Id. ¶ 148.
169
Id. ¶ 151.
170
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (Mar. 29, 2006).
166
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so, the Court rejected Paraguay’s three claimed defenses, namely
that the claimed lands had been conveyed to private owners “for a
long time,” that the lands were “adequately exploited,” and that the
private owners’ rights in the lands were now protected by a bilateral
investment agreement between Paraguay and Germany.171 With respect to the defense that the claimed lands were now in private
hands, the Court demurred from deciding “that Sawhoyamaxa Community’s property rights to traditional lands prevail over the right to
property of private owners or vice versa, since the Court is not a
domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes
among private parties. This power is vested exclusively in the Paraguayan State.”172
The Court did not hesitate, however, to find the presence of innocent third party purchasers insufficient as a ground for dismissing
prima facie the claims by indigenous peoples since otherwise those
rights would “become meaningless.”173 It also rejected defenses that
the land was currently productive since this argument addressed
only the economic productivity of the land and not the “distinctive
characteristics” of the indigenous peoples. 174 With respect to Paraguay’s third argument, the Court noted that it had not been provided
with the text of the bilateral investment agreement but understood
that this treaty permitted nationalizations for a “public purpose or
interest” and did not in itself preclude restitution of the land.175 It
also added that the enforcement of such bilateral treaties “should
always be compatible with the American Convention, which is a
multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own
and that generates rights for individual human beings and does not
depend entirely on reciprocity among States.”176 Ultimately the
IACtHR found that Paraguay had not ensured the right protected under Article 21 since,
when a State is unable, on objective and reasoned
grounds, to adopt measures aimed at returning traditional lands and communal resources to indigenous
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id. ¶¶ 137–41.
Id. ¶ 136.
Id. ¶ 138.
Id. ¶ 139.
Id. ¶ 140.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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populations, it must surrender alternative lands of
equal extension and quality, which will be chosen by
agreement with the members of the indigenous peoples, according to their own consultation and decision procedures.177
B. Claims Involving Private Property
1. DEFINING PROTECTED PROPERTY
The IACtHR has explored three sets of issues relating to the definition of property: the general definition of the term; whether it extends to rights held by shareholders; and the extent to which it covers
certain “acquired rights.” Early on, the IACtHR defined “property”
in Article 21 broadly, as including “material objects that may be appropriated, and also any right that may form part of a person’s patrimony; this concept includes all movable and immovable property,
corporal and incorporeal elements, and any other intangible object
of any value.”178 In its 2005 ruling in Palamara-Iribarne, the Court
elaborated on this last element and included intellectual property.179
It explained this on the basis of a presumptive link between labor
and property:
The protection of the use and enjoyment of a person’s works, grants the author rights which have both
tangible and intangible aspects. The tangible dimension of such property rights includes, among other
aspects, the publication, exploitation, assignment, or
transfer of the works, while the intangible dimension

177

Id. ¶ 135 (citing Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 149 (June 31,
2005)).
178
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 122 (Feb. 6, 2001). It also included “within the
broad concept of ‘assets’ whose use and enjoyment are protected by the Convention . . . works resulting from the intellectual creation of a person, who, as the
author of such works, acquires thereupon the property rights related to the use and
enjoyment thereof.” Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶ 102 (Nov. 22, 2005).
179
Palamara-Iribarne, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶ 102.
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of such rights is related to the safeguard of the authorship of the works and the protection of the integrity thereof. The intangible dimension is the link between the creator and the works, which extends over
time. The exercise of both the tangible dimension
and the intangible dimension of property rights is
susceptible of having value and becomes part of a
person’s assets.180
On the issue of shareholders’ rights, the IACtHR has elaborated
and distinguished the concept in four rulings. In the 2001 IvcherBronstein case, the Court relied on the ICJ’s Barcelona Traction decision to distinguish the legal rights of companies (not covered by
the Convention) and the specific direct rights of shareholders (which
are protected).181 In Ivcher-Bronstein, the Court found that the challenged government measures had indeed obstructed shareholders’
specific rights and that therefore these rights had been violated.182 It
reached a similar conclusion in 2007 in Chaparro Álvarez & Lapo
Íñiguez, where the Court examined whether the underlying government measures affected the shareholders’ rights to receive dividends, to attend and vote at general meetings, and to receive part of
the company’s assets at liquidation.183
In its 2009 ruling in Perozo v. Venezuela, however, the Court
clarified that demonstrating harm to company assets does not in and
of itself prove harm to the specific rights enjoyed by that company’s
shareholders.184 In that case the Court found that the property of
Globovisión TV was damaged as a result of government action, but
that damage to its premises was not proven to cause an “an abridgment of the rights of Mr. Ravell and Zuloaga, in their capacity as
shareholders of the company.”185 It maintained these views in the
notorious case of Radio Caracas Televisión v. Venezuela, which
180

Id. ¶ 103.
Ivcher-Bronstein, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 127.
182
Id.
183
Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170,
¶¶ 181–82, 189, 195 (Nov. 21, 2007).
184
Perozo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195, ¶¶ 402–03 (Jan. 28, 2009).
185
Id. ¶ 402.
181
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arose from the decision of the Venezuelan government of Hugo
Chávez to not renew the broadcasting license of that network, which
had been very critical of the government.186 In response to a contention that the radio station (RCTV) was a vehicle for freedom of expression, the Court reiterated its position distinguishing the property
rights of the company from the property rights of its shareholders:
On the argument that the general rule of separation
of the assets of the company and that of the shareholders should not be applied, the Court has established that the legal person of RCTV was a vehicle
for the freedom of expression of its workers and directives, however, it does not find that this constitutes sufficient legal ground to hold that as a result of
that instrumental function the separation between the
assets of the legal person and that of the shareholders
has disappeared. The Court reiterates that the rights
of the shareholders of a company are different to the
rights of a legal person. Thus, to dismiss the legal
personality of the company and to attribute the partners the legitimacy to claim for the damages generated by acts aimed at the company, there must be sufficient evidence to support said relationship.187
A third category of definitional issues arose in a series of applications regarding the rights that emerge, under Article 21, from the
assignment of pensions and, in more recent cases, other obligations
owed to individuals. In the seminal 2003 “Five Pensioners” case,
the applicants had retired and their employer, the Superintendency
of Banks and Insurance of Peru (SBS) had assigned them a pension
equal to the salary earned by the person in their former position at
that time.188 Subsequently, the SBS decided to decrease or discontinue the payments without notice189 and the pensioners argued that
186
Granier y Otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 293, ¶¶ 1, 338–39 (June 22, 2015).
187
Id. ¶ 350 (unofficial translation from Spanish by author).
188
“Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98, ¶ 8 (Feb. 28, 2003).
189
Id. ¶ 83(a).
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they had an acquired right to these payments.190 After considering
the domestic legislation in point, the Court upheld the pensioners’
claims, concluding that pursuant to the Peruvian Constitution they
had an acquired right to their former pensions.191 The Court further
explained the meaning of an acquired right by stating, “in other
words, a right that has been incorporated into the patrimony of the
persons.”192 The Court built on its “Five Pensioners” decision in its
2009 ruling in Acevedo Buendía.193 There, it found that the claimants enjoyed a right to an adjustable pension that had been affirmed
by Peruvian courts.194 The IACtHR concluded that the governments’ lack of observance of constitutional judgments which had
affirmed these “patrimonial” rights was itself a violation of Article
21 of the Convention.195
In the 2011 Abrill Alosilla case, the Court extended this reasoning to include not only pensions, but also other similar sources of
income that produced “wealth effects.”196 According to the Court,
“just as pensions that have complied with all legal requirements are
part of the wealth of a worker, the salary, benefits and raises earned
by that worker are also protected by the right to property enshrined
in the Convention.”197 In that case, a series of decrees issued during
the Peruvian process of state reform of the early 1990s, under the
presidency of Alberto Fujimori, imposed retroactive cuts in the salaries of public workers that were operative approximately one year
before the decrees were issued.198 As a result, the workers began
receiving their salaries with reductions, because, according to the
new scheme envisaged in the decrees, they had erroneously been
190
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Acevedo Buendía v. Perú, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, ¶¶ 85–86 (July 1, 2009).
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paid in excess during the past year.199 The Court found a violation
based on the impact on a “vested right.”200
It applied similar reasoning a year later in Furlan and Family v.
Argentina.201 In that case, Sebastián Furlan had an accident while
playing as a child in an abandoned military base near Buenos Aires,
Argentina.202 As a result, he had several medical conditions and disabilities which led to a suit and an eventual settlement with the government for compensation.203 However, a later law, passed in the
early 1990s, changed the payment options available to Furlan.204 After he opted for payment through consolidated bonds issued for sixteen-year terms and attempted to sell these, Furlan ended up receiving less than 30% of the money from his initial settlement.205 For
the Court, the question was whether Furlan had an acquired right
over the settlement, and whether the payment method constituted a
violation of Article 21 of the Convention.206 Although the Court
found that Argentina had the right to change the payment terms in
response to an economic crisis, it found the impact on Furlan’s settlement to be disproportionate and found in his favor.207 But arguments based on such acquired rights have not been successful in at
least two other cases.208
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Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 234, ¶ 238 (Oct. 13, 2011) (rejecting the claims
of holders of bank accounts who had been unsuccessful in securing their savings
pursuant to an administrative procedure established by the government in the
wake of a financial crisis); Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293, ¶¶ 180, 343 (June 22, 2015) (rejecting the contention that the non-renewal of a radio broadcasting license interfered with an acquired right).
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2. DEFINING DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY
The IACtHR has faced three kinds of cases in which it addressed
what constitutes a deprivation of property: classic cases of expropriation, instances involving civil forfeiture, and cases involving damage to property in the course of law enforcement. It has also referred
to a special category of “grave” cases.
a. Expropriations
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right to property
is not an absolute right,209 and that deprivations of property may be
lawful if three requisites are fulfilled, namely when government
measures are based on “reasons of public utility or social interest,
subject to the payment of just compensation,” proceed according to
the forms established by law, and are carried out in accordance with
the Convention.210 The Court has also underlined the social role of
the right to property, namely that it
must be understood within the context of a democratic society where in order for the public welfare
and the collective rights to prevail there must be proportional measures that guarantee individual rights.
The social role of the property is a fundamental element for its functioning and for this reason, the State,
in order to guarantee other fundamental rights of vital relevance in a specific society, can limit or restrict
the right to property, always respecting the cases
209
See e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 170, ¶ 174 (Nov. 21, 2007); Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶ 108 (Nov. 22, 2005);
Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection and Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 61 (May 6, 2008); Perozo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 195, ¶ 399 (Jan. 28, 2009); Acevedo Buendía v. Perú, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 198, ¶ 84 (July 1, 2009); Abrill Alosilla, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 223, ¶ 82; Furlan and Family, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 220.
210
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 128 (Feb. 6, 2001). See also Chaparro Álvarez,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170, ¶ 174; Salvador Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 61.
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contained in Article 21 of the Convention and the
general principles of international law.211
Finally, the IACtHR has also suggested that its evaluation would
be attentive to context, that is, that it “should not restrict itself to
evaluating whether a formal dispossession or expropriation took
place, but should look beyond mere appearances and establish the
real situation behind the situation that was denounced.”212
The IACtHR has defined reasons of public interest broadly, noting that these
comprise all those legally protected interests that, for
the use assigned to them, allow a better development
of the democratic society. To such end, the States
must consider all the means possible to affect as little
as possible other rights and therefore, undertake the
underlying obligations in accordance with the Convention.213
It found such justifications absent in the 2001 case of Ivcher-Bronstein. There, the Court ruled that the precautionary measure, which
effectively removed Mr. Ivcher from his role as director and chairman of a media company, could not be justified on the basis that his
Peruvian nationality had been annulled by the government. 214 Specifically, it found
no evidence or argument to confirm that the precautionary measure ordered by Judge Percy Escobar was
based on reasons of public utility or social interest;
to the contrary, the proven facts in this case coincide
to show the State’s determination to deprive Mr.
Ivcher of the control of Channel 2, by suspending his
rights as a shareholder of the Company that owned
it.215
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212

Salvador Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 60.
Ivcher-Bronstein, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 124 (footnote omit-
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But it found the government’s justifications fully justified in the
2008 Salvador Chiriboga case, where it concluded that an expropriation carried out to build a public park was acceptable.216
The IACtHR’s view of what constitutes “just compensation” has
been influenced by, among other things, determinations made by the
ECtHR.217 The IACtHR has suggested that such compensation
needs to be “prompt, adequate, and effective.”218 It has noted that at
least in the context of expropriation, the just compensation that must
be paid needs to take into account “the trade value of the property
prior to the declaration of public utility . . . and also, the fair balance
between the general interest and the individual interest . . . .”219 The
Court has also focused attention on whether the domestic legislation
fulfills this principle of just compensation, and whether the state authorities exercise “due diligence” in applying the law.220
In the 2008 Salvador Chiriboga case, the Court elaborated on
the need to follow procedures established by law:
[T]his Tribunal notes that the domestic legislation of
Ecuador provided for in the then Article 62 of the
Political Constitution, at the moment, article 33 of
the Constitution, the requirements to exercise the
condemnatory function of the State. Among such requirements, the law emphasizes the need to follow a
procedure within the term established in the procedural rules, by means of a prior appraisal, payment
and compensation[]. In this sense, the European
Court of Human Rights . . . in the expropriation
cases, has pointed out that the nullum crimen nulla
poena sine lege praevia principle [principle of lawfulness] is a decisive condition in order to verify the
combination of a violation of the right to property
and has insisted on the fact that this principle implies
that the legislation that regulates the deprivation of

216

Salvador Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 76.
Id. ¶¶ 96–97.
218
Id. ¶ 96 (in accordance with a “general principle of the international law”).
219
Id. ¶ 98.
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the right to property must be clear, specific and foreseeable.221
The Court also suggested the type of national legislation needed to
satisfy the rule of law. It noted that,
it is not necessary that every cause for deprivation or
restriction to the right to property be embodied in the
law; but that it is essential that such law and its application respect the essential content of the right to
property. This right entails that every limitation to
such right must be exceptional. As a consequence, all
restrictive measure must be necessary for the attainment of a legal goal in a democratic society in accordance with the purpose and end of the American
Convention.222
b. Civil Forfeiture
The first civil forfeiture case faced by the IACtHR was relatively
easy.223 In 1995, Daniel Tibi was arrested in Ecuador under false
charges of drug-dealing.224 At that moment, eighty-five items that
were in his possession (including some valuable art and gems) were
seized by the police and entered into the record.225 When Tibi was
finally released, in 1998 (after being tortured and subject to a number of atrocities),226 and requested the return of his possessions, “the
judge asked Mr. Tibi to demonstrate “pre-existence and property”
of the goods seized”—an order that was reversed by an appeals
court.227 Not surprisingly, the IACtHR seized the opportunity to
clarify that in such a context those subject to civil forfeiture do not
have the burden of proof.228 Since Mr. Tibi had the goods on him
221

Id. ¶ 64 (footnotes omitted).
Id. ¶ 65 (footnote omitted).
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when he was seized, he “was not under the obligation to demonstrate
pre-existence or property of the goods seized for them to be returned
to him.”229
The second case of civil forfeiture proved more difficult. Humberto Antonio Palamara-Iribarne was a naval mechanic engineer
who served for twenty-one years in the Chilean navy.230 In 1992, he
wrote a book entitled “Ética y Servicios de Inteligencia” (“Ethics
and Intelligence Services”) and asked for authorization to publish it,
as required by the rules of the Navy.231 When Palamara-Iribarne was
denied the authorization on the basis that the book allegedly posed
a threat to national security and defense, he decided to publish it
nevertheless.232 The Navy then instituted criminal proceedings
against him.233 During the process, a naval prosecutor seized all copies of the book and deleted the electronic copies available both at
the publishing offices and at Palamara-Iribirane’s house.234 Later in
the process, the naval prosecutor conducted investigations to find
the “missing copies” of the book, “and the Naval Judge prevented
the case from being sent to full trial until all copies of the book were
collected.”235 After lengthy proceedings, Palamara-Iribarne was finally found guilty and sentenced to more than two years of prison.236
The Naval Judge also ordered the
forfeiture of 900 copies of the book . . . a floppy disk
containing the complete text of the publication, 6,213
loose sheets of paper making up the book . . . 90 thin
cardboard covers of said book, 4 of which were half
printed, 31 brochures advertising the book and 15
thin cardboard sheets with the cover design of the
book . . . .237
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Although the Navy ultimately decided to acquit Plamara-Iribirane, a further legal battle ensued after he criticized the actions of
the Navy at a press conference. Palamara-Iribirane ultimately sought
relief in the IACtHR arguing, inter alia, that the seizure of the books
and of the electronic data constituted a violation of his right to property.238 The IACtHR confirmed that the actions of the state deprived
Palamara-Iribarne of both his tangible and intangible property without compensation.239 It also affirmed, along the way, that the taking
of the books and the erasure of data “constituted acts of censorship”
under Article 13 of the Convention.240 It concluded that the government had not demonstrated that the deprivation of property in this
case was justified by an “institutional interest.”241
A third case, though similar to the Tibi case, had its own complexities. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiquez v. Ecuador also involved false charges of drug-trafficking, but the property seized was
not just personal belongings, but an entire factory.242 In 1997, Ecuadorian anti-narcotics police found illegal drugs inside ice chests contained in a fish cargo shipment destined for Miami.243 Because Juan
Carlos Chaparro Álvarez’s factory produced ice chests similar to
those found with illegal drugs, the police arrested him and confiscated the factory; although he was later acquitted, the factory was
not returned to him for almost five years since it had been confiscated.244 The Court first considered whether the adoption of precautionary measures regarding property was a violation of Article 21.245
The Court cautiously responded that such measures do not “constitute per se a violation of the right to property, if it is considered that
they do not signify a transfer of the ownership of the right to legal
title.”246 But the Court suggested that these measures in context
would be justified only if the government demonstrated
238
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the inexistence of another type of measure that is less
restrictive of the right to property. In this regard, it is
only admissible to seize and deposit property when
there is clear evidence of its connection to the offense, and provided that it is necessary to guarantee
the investigation and the payment of the applicable
pecuniary responsibilities, or to avoid the loss or deterioration of the evidence. Also, these measures
must be adopted and supervised by judicial officials,
taking into account that, if the reasons that justified
the precautionary measure cease to exist, the judge
must assess the pertinence of maintaining the restriction, even before the proceedings are concluded.
This point is extremely important, given that if the
property ceases to fulfill a relevant role in continuing
or promoting the investigation, the material precautionary measure must be lifted, because they run the
risk of becoming an anticipated punishment. The latter would constitute a manifestly disproportionate restriction of the right to property.247
Further, the Court clarified that when issuing precautionary
measures, “the national authorities are obliged to provide reasons
that justify the appropriateness of the measure. This requires them
to clarify the ‘fumus boni iuris,’ in other words, that there are sufficient probabilities and evidence that the property was really involved in the offense.”248 The Court also disapproved of the state’s
attempt to impose charges on the accused for the maintenance of the
seized property:
In this regard, the Court emphasizes that material
precautionary measures are adopted with regard to
the property of a person who is presumed innocent;
hence, these measures should not prejudice the accused disproportionately. The charges that a person
whose case has been dismissed is required to pay,

247
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with regard to the property of which he was provisionally dispossessed, constitute a burden that is tantamount to a sanction. This requirement is disproportionate for those persons whose guilt has not been
proved.249
The Court found that delays in the return of the property as well
as the failure to return part of the property constituted a violation of
Article 21.250 It also affirmed that the “unsatisfactory administration” of Mr. Chaparro’s property by the State amounted to a violation of Article 21, because he “was deprived arbitrarily of the possibility of continuing to receive the profits that he obtained when the
company was operating.”251
The 2013 Mémoli v. Argentina decision presented a new challenge for the Court’s approach to civil forfeiture and judicial interference with property. This case concerned a suit for libel damages
which lasted over seventeen years, during which the defendants,
Carlos and Pablo Mémoli, were subject to a general injunction on
their assets.252 The Court found that this constituted a violation of
their rights, including the right to property:
The Court finds that this lack of diligence of the authorities is especially relevant when considering that
the presumed victims have been subject to a precautionary measure of a general injunction on property
for more than 17 years, based on possible civil damages. According to the applicable domestic laws, this
type of measure entails a “general prohibition to sell
or encumber property” and is not limited to a specific
amount. The Court recalls that the adoption of precautionary measures involving private property does
not constitute per se a violation of the right to property, even when it does represent a limitation of this
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right, to the extent that it affects an individual’s ability to dispose freely of his property.253
Although the Court found that measures imposed on the claimants had been properly “established by law,”254 it found their application in this instance unfairly punitive because:
the domestic judicial authorities did not establish the
possibility of moderating the impact of the duration
of the civil proceeding on the ability of the presumed
victims to dispose of their property, nor did they take
into account that, according to Argentine law, “[t]he
judge, to avoid unnecessary liens and prejudice to the
owner of the property, may establish a precautionary
measure other than the one requested, or limit it, taking into account the significance of the right that it is
sought to protect.” Despite this provision, the precautionary measure has been in force for more than 17
years and, according to the information in the case
file provided to this Court, was re-ordered in December 2011, which presumes that it will be in effect until December 2016 . . . . In brief, the prolonged duration of the proceeding, in principle of a summary nature, combined with the general injunction on property for more than 17 years, has constituted a disproportionate impairment of the right to property of
Messrs. Mémoli and has resulted in the precautionary measures becoming punitive measures.255
c. Damage to Property in the Course of Law Enforcement
Between 1998 and 2011, five members of the Barrios family
were killed, and the whole family was subjected to different instances of harassment by the police of the Venezuelan state of Aragua.256 In this context, the Court found that the right to property of
the surviving members
253
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255
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was affected by the fact that, during the search of
their homes, police agents removed without authorization and failed to return household appliances,
money, medicines, clothes and articles of personal
hygiene, destroyed documents, clothes and household appliances, and set fire to part of the residence
of Luis Alberto Barrios and Orismar Carolina Alzul
García. The victims were deprived of the said possessions without any justification, and the State has
not specifically contested these facts or provided explanations about what happened.257
A similar case was decided by the Court a year later. In 2001,
police agents in the state of Falcón, in Venezuela, raided Néstor José
Uzcátegui’s home, beat members of his family, and assassinated
him.258 His brother Luis, the main witness of the crime, had denounced the killing publicly and had been subject to harassment and
arbitrary detentions by the police.259 In this context, the Court considered that damage to the Uzcátegui’s property by law enforcement, when raiding their home could be considered a violation of
Article 21.260 The decision of the Court was highly contextual:
The Court also finds that, given the circumstances in
which the action took place and, in particular, the socioeconomic status and vulnerability of the Uzcátegui family, the damage to their property during
the raid had a far greater impact than it would have
had for other family groups with other means. In this
regard, the Court considers that States must take into
account that groups of people living in adverse circumstances and with fewer resources, such as those
living in poverty, experience an increase in the extent
257
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to which their rights are affected, precisely because
of their more vulnerable situation.261
The Court noted that “it is public knowledge that such people
were frequently subjected to intimidation through the destruction of
their goods, homes or personal belongings.”262 It found that
the damage caused to the structure and furniture of
the Uzcátegui’s home, had a significant impact on
the family’s property and therefore concludes that
the State violated the right to property established in
Article 21(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof . . . .263
d. Cases of “Special Gravity”
In the 2006 case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, the Court
stated that certain violations of the right to property were of “particular gravity”264 or “particularly serious.”265 In that case, a paramilitary group in Colombia, while raiding a town, set fire to 80% of the
houses and stole cattle.266 Members of the Colombian Army knew
of the theft and even collaborated with the paramilitary by imposing
a curfew that restricted the inhabitants from protecting their possessions.267
The Court first underlined how the theft of the livestock was a
grave violation of Article 21 of the Convention:
The Court finds it opportune to underscore the particular gravity of the theft of the livestock of the inhabitants of El Aro and the surrounding areas. As the
Commission and the representatives have emphasized, from the characteristics of the district and the
daily activities of the inhabitants, it is clear that there
261
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was a close relationship between the latter and their
livestock, because their main means of subsistence
was cultivating the land and raising livestock. Indeed, the damage suffered by those who lost their
livestock, from which they earned their living, is especially severe. Over and above the loss of their main
source of income and food, the way in which the livestock was stolen, with the explicit and implicit collaboration of members of the Army, increased the
villagers’ feelings of impotence and vulnerability.268
Moreover, the Court found that the violation of property rights
in this case was “particularly serious[,]” noting its close relationship
“to the maintenance of basic living conditions . . . .”269 It applied
similar reasoning with respect to the house burnings:
This Court also considers that setting fire to the
houses in El Aro constituted a grave violation of an
object that was essential to the population. The purpose of setting fire to and destroying the homes of
the people of El Aro was to spread terror and cause
their displacement, so as to gain territory in the fight
against the guerrilla in Colombia . . . . Therefore, the
effect of the destruction of the homes was the loss,
not only of material possessions, but also of the social frame of reference of the inhabitants, some of
whom had lived in the village all their lives. In addition to constituting an important financial loss, the
destruction of their homes caused the inhabitants to
lose their most basic living conditions; this means
that the violation of the right to property in this case
is particularly grave.270
The Court has reiterated its stance on the right to property in
relation to massacres in later cases. In the 2012 Massacres of El
Mozote case against El Salvador, where the armed forces had carried
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out “a consecutive series of massive, collective and indiscriminate
executions of defenseless individuals[,]”271 the Court found that
soldiers stripped the victims of their possessions, set
fire to their homes, destroyed and burned their crops
and killed their animals, so that the operation of the
Armed Forces consisted in a sequence of events that
simultaneously affected a series of rights, including
the right to property. Consequently, the Court concludes that the State violated Article 21(1) and 21(2)
of the American Convention, in relation to Article
1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of the victims
executed in the massacres or of their next of kin.272
While addressing the surviving victims, the tribunal underlined,
as in previous cases, the gravity of these violations:
The right to property is a human right and, in this
case, its violation is especially serious and significant, not only because of the loss of tangible assets,
but also because of the loss of the most basic living
conditions and of every social reference point of the
people who lived in these villages. As expert witness
María Sol Yáñez de la Cruz underscored, “[n]ot only
was the civilian population exterminated, but also the
whole symbolic and social tissue. They destroyed
homes and significant objects. They stripped the people of their clothes, the children’s toys, and their family photographs; they removed and destroyed everything that was important to them. They killed or took
the animals; they all recount that they took the cows,
the hens; they took my cows, they killed two bulls: a
loss of both material and affective significance in the
peasant universe. Scorched earth is a type of violation and stigmatization by soldiers, created by the
perpetrators. The scale of the horror perpetrated there
271
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was aimed at annihilating the area, with all its inhabitants, to vacate the territory, to expel them from the
area.” Furthermore, “[i]t was a rationale of extermination, of total destruction of the social mechanisms.
[ . . . ] The massacre disintegrated the collective identity, by leaving a social vacuum where the community had once carried out its rituals, its affective exchanges, the context and the framework in which
they knew they were part of a community.”273
That same year, the Court rendered its judgment concerning the
Santo Domingo Massacre. In that case, the Colombian armed forces
bombed a small village, forced its inhabitants to abandon the area,
and looted their houses.274 As in previous cases, the Court referred
to the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals to emphasize
that looting constitutes “a serious violation of the laws and customs
of war.”275 It then took a step further, suggesting that the gravity of
the situation was heightened by the situation of poverty in which the
victims lived:
In addition, the Court has considered that, owing to
the circumstances in which the events took place, and
especially owing to the socio-economic conditions
and vulnerability of the presumed victims, the damage caused to their property may have a greater effect
and significance than that caused to other persons or
groups under other conditions. In this regard, the
Court finds that the States must take into account that
groups of people who live in poverty face an increased degree of harm to their rights, precisely due
to their situation of greater vulnerability.276

273

Id. ¶ 180 (footnotes omitted).
Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶¶ 68–69, 75, 79
(Nov. 30, 2012).
275
Id. ¶ 272 (quoting Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶
101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003)).
276
Id. ¶ 273 (citing Uzcátegui v. Venezuela, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 249, ¶ 204 (Sept. 3, 2012)).
274
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IV. U.S. COURTS’ DIFFICULTIES WITH THE HUMAN
RIGHT OF PROPERTY
As scholars of U.S. Indian law have pointed out, U.S. jurisprudence on point—not international law—has largely defined the extent of inherent tribal “sovereignty” or “self-determination” in terms
of the scope of the federal government’s powers over Indian tribes
under the U.S. Constitution.277 While the international law of “discovery,” played a role in the original U.S. cases dealing with Indian
rights—largely in terms of justifying the United States’ exclusive
right to buy or approve the sale of Indian lands based on Europeans’
claims over the New World that transferred to the United States—
the role of international law, and especially of international human
rights, has played a peripheral role at best in modern U.S. case law
on point.278 While there is some uncertainty in U.S. Indian law jurisprudence as to whether its “particular doctrines arise out of [U.S.]
constitutional law, international law, or domestic common law,”279
that case law does not rely on an alleged human right to communal
property as defined by the IACtHR in its interpretation of Article 21
of the American Convention.280
U.S. courts’ focus on assessing the extent of relevant federal
power—whether defined as “plenary” or as expressing a unique obligation of “trusteeship” towards Indian tribes281—is dramatically
different from the concerns expressed by the IACtHR in comparable
cases. Whereas the IACtHR seems acutely aware of the historic injustices done to indigenous peoples and the need to rectify these,
preferably through restitution of lost lands and close consultation
277

See, e.g., Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1752–53 (2003).
278
Id. at 1752–54, 1762–64.
279
Id. at 1755.
280
See id. at 1762–63. This is hardly surprising since, as is demonstrated by
the Appendix, the U.S. is not a party to the American Convention of Human
Rights – or to many of the human rights conventions listed there.
281
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (reaffirming congressional plenary power in modern Indian affairs); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 302 (1902) (“As we have said, the title to these lands is held
by the tribe in trust for the people . . . . While we have recognized these tribes as
dependent nations, the government has likewise recognized its guardianship over
the Indians and it obligations to protect them in their property and personal
rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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with the affected communities, such “therapeutic” concerns and
remedies do not register in relevant U.S. jurisprudence.282 The IACtHR’s emphasis on the need to take into account the ways indigenous peoples have traditionally associated with the land—for cultural identity and economic survival—and to adopt consensus-based
remedies that allow these communities to enjoy land rights in perpetuity, despite intervening interruptions, are not characteristic of
relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.283 Indeed, even when
U.S. courts have ruled in favor of tribal rights, this is most likely to
occur as a result of a need to defer to the express will of Congress.284
The lack of attention in U.S. Indian law to the possibility that
international law might require restoring communal land rights is
reflected even in the work of those who would like to reform such
law. A recent Harvard Note proposing that international law should
play a greater role in federal Indian law identifies the “emerging”
law governing indigenous peoples (including ILO Convention No.
169), the international law with respect to self-determination, and
international human rights requiring non-discrimination with respect to cultural integrity—but does not mention the rights of property contained in all the human rights instruments contained in the
Appendix.285
But if the international law of property plays a non-role with respect to U.S. Indian law, its fate with respect to efforts to attempt to
enforce an international human right relating to the protection of private property in U.S. courts is even more dire. While such claims
have arisen in U.S. courts in a number of different contexts, the status of the human right of property has arisen most often in connection with suits against foreign states involving rights in property
“taken in violation of international law”—an anomalous exception

282

See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The United States Supreme Court and Indigenous Peoples: Still a Long Way to Go Toward a Therapeutic Role, 24 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 229, 229 (2000).
283
See id. at 231 (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to embrace “due
process” values attentive to accommodating the views of both majority institutions and minorities such as indigenous peoples).
284
Id. at 232–33.
285
Note, supra note 277, at 1756–62. This is so even though the Note includes
discussion of the IACtHR’s Awas Tingni case. Id. at 1761.
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from foreign sovereign immunity contained in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).286 As one U.S. circuit court
has noted, this exception “was intended to subject to United States
jurisdiction any foreign agency or instrumentality that has nationalized or expropriated property without compensation, or that is using
expropriated property taken by another branch of the state.” 287 The
four requisites that must be satisfied to apply this exception from
sovereign immunity—proving that “property rights” are at issue,
that the property was indeed “taken,” that the taking was in violation
of international law, and that the claim involves a nexus to the
United States (such as a commercial nexus)—have each generated
significant interpretative case law.288 The focus here is on how U.S.
courts have interpreted the third crucial requirement, namely
demonstrating that the taking was “in violation of international law.”
United States courts, including the Eleventh Circuit which foreclosed Mr. Mezerhane’s claims against Venezuela289 mentioned at
the outset, have uniformly resisted claims that government takings
of its own national’s property violates international law. Courts have
dismissed property claims against foreign sovereigns when such
claims involve what the courts call “domestic takings”—that is takings of property owned by a state’s own nationals.290 This judicially
286

Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
287
De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale
Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 204 (5th Cir. 1984)).
288
See Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d
247, 251 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d
661, 671 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Fisher v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777
F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015). The D.C. Circuit has taken a slightly different approach.
It has indicated that such a claim “must meet three requirements to fit within the
FSIA’s expropriation exception: (i) the claim must be one in which ‘rights in
property’ are ‘in issue’; (ii) the property in question must have been ‘taken in
violation of international law’; and (iii) one of two commercial-activity nexuses
with the United States must be satisfied.” Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812
F.3d 127, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 939–42 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
289
Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549, 551
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016).
290
Id. at 549 (noting the Fifth Circuit’s “long-standing rule that closes the
doors of American courts to international-law claims based on a foreign country’s
domestic taking of property”).

2018]

THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY

637

created “domestic takings” rule apparently stems from language deployed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1937 decision in United
States v. Belmont.291 There, the Supreme Court explained that
“[w]hat another country has done in the way of taking over property
of its nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for
judicial consideration . . . . Such nationals must look to their own
government for any redress to which they may be entitled.” 292 Following this precedent, U.S. courts have concluded that, “[a]s a rule,
when a foreign nation confiscates the property of its own nationals,
it does not implicate principles of international law.”293
The leading application of this “domestic takings” rule remains
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua.294 The oft-cited passages from that 1985 ruling state that,
[w]ith a few limited exceptions, international law delineates minimum standards for the protection only
of aliens; it does not purport to interfere with the relations between a nation and its own citizens. Thus,
even if Banco Central’s actions might have violated
international law had they been taken with respect to
291

301 U.S. 324 (1937).
Id. at 332.
293
FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted). See also, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Expropriation by a sovereign state of the property of
its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law.”) (citations omitted), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining
“the exception does not apply where the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant
country at the time of the expropriation”); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317
F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh’g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th
Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (explaining that “[t]o fall
into this exception, the plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the defendant country at the
time of the expropriation”); Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 353 F.3d 1323,
1328 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“International law prohibits expropriation of alien
property without compensation, but does not prohibit governments from expropriating property from their own nationals without compensation.”) (citation
omitted); Santivanez v. Estado Plurinacional De Bolivia, 512 F. App’x 887, 889
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause the Bolivian government expropriated land owned
by Francisco Loza—a Bolivian national—no violation of international law occurred.”).
294
770 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985).
292
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an alien’s property, the fact that they were taken with
respect to the intangible property rights of a Nicaraguan national means that they were outside the ambit
of international law.295
....
International law, as its name suggests, deals with relations between sovereign states, not between states
and individuals . . . . Nations not individuals have
been its traditional subjects . . . . Injuries to individuals have been cognizable only where they implicate
two or more different nations: if one state injures the
national of another state, then this can give rise to a
violation of international law since the individual’s
injury is viewed as an injury to his state. As long as
a nation injures only its own nationals, however, then
no other state’s interest is involved; the injury is a
purely domestic affair, to be resolved within the confines of the nation itself . . . .296
Recently, this traditional dichotomy between injuries
to states and to individuals—and between injuries to
home-grown and to alien individuals—has begun to
erode. The international human rights movement is
premised on the belief that international law sets a
minimum standard not only for the treatment of aliens but also for the treatment of human beings generally. Nevertheless, the standards of human rights
that have been generally accepted—and hence incorporated into the law of nations—are still limited.
They encompass only such basic rights as the right
not to be murdered, tortured, or otherwise subjected
to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment; the right
not to be a slave; and the right not to be arbitrarily
detained . . . . At present, the taking by a state of its
national’s property does not contravene the international law of minimum human rights. This has been
295
296

Id. at 1395.
Id. at 1396 (citations and footnote omitted).
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held to be true in much more egregious situations
than the present, including cases where the plaintiff
had had his property taken pursuant to Nazi racial decrees.297
The judges in De Sanchez also indicated, along the way, what
may be a more fundamental reason for their resistance to the invocation of the FSIA’s expropriation exception:
The doctrine that international law does not generally
govern disputes between a state and its own nationals
rests on fundamental principles. At base, it is what
makes individuals subjects of one state rather than of
the international community generally. If we could
inquire into the legitimacy under international law of
Nicaragua’s actions here, then virtually no internal
measure would be immune from our scrutiny. Concomitantly, actions of the United States affecting the
property of American citizens would become subject
to international norms and hence reviewable by the
courts of other nations. In the field of international
law, where no single sovereign reigns supreme, the
Golden Rule takes on added poignancy. Just as we
would resent foreign courts from telling us how we
can and cannot rule ourselves, we should be reluctant
to tell other nations how to govern themselves. Only
where a state has engaged in conduct against its citizens that outrages basic standards of human rights or
that calls into question the territorial sovereignty of
the United States is it appropriate for us to interfere.298
The reasoning used in De Sánchez has been widely cited by and
relied upon by other U.S. courts. Thus, when Mr. Mezerhane presented his claims against Venezuela outlined at the beginning of this
Article, the results were in a sense pre-ordained. The Eleventh Circuit felt no need to consider whether, as expert witness Joseph

297
298

Id. at 1396–97 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 1397–98.
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Weiler had argued below to the district court,299 a right to property
exists as a matter of customary law or general principles.300 Instead,
the appellate court simply adhered to established precedent to find,
once again, that “[a]s a rule, when a foreign nation confiscates the
property of its own nationals, it does not implicate principles of international law . . . . such claims simply are not international.”301
The court rejected Mezerhane’s argument that, in the thirty years
since De Sanchez was decided, international human rights law had
developed such that FSIA’s “expropriation exception” now encompassed so-called “domestic takings.”302 As in De Sanchez, the Mezerhane Court added that its conclusion also stemmed from a reluctance to “open the courts of this country to suits involving takings
abroad by foreign governments that have little or no nexus to the
United States.”303
Although the “domestic takings” rule remains operative within
U.S. courts, it may be subject to one exception. Despite the reference
to Nazi takings in De Sanchez, some U.S. courts have since come to
accept claims under the FSIA’s “expropriation exception” to the extent these involve “genocidal takings.”304 In a series of decisions
concerning the taking of property during the Holocaust, U.S. circuit
courts have upheld jurisdiction to consider these claims against foreign states on the proposition that such claims, unlike the typical
“domestic taking,” really do involve human rights law.305 Genocidal
takings have successfully punctured sovereign immunity because,
as the Fifth Circuit put it, these deprivations of property violate

299

Rep. and Op. of Prof. Joseph H.H. Weiler at 4, 9–11, Mezerhane v.
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 1:11–CV–23983–MGC (S.D. Fla. Nov.
30, 2012), ECF No. 59-1 [hereinafter Weiler Report].
300
Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549–52
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016).
301
Id. at 549–50 (quoting FOGADE v. ENB Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274,
1294 (11th Cir. 2001)).
302
Id.
303
Id. at 549.
304
Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
305
Id.
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“such basic rights as the right not to be murdered, tortured, or otherwise subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment; the
right not to be a slave; and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.”306
The Seventh Circuit’s 2012 ruling in Abelesz, for example,
acknowledged the continuing application of the domestic takings
rule,307 but found that
the plaintiffs’ allegations about the relationship between genocide and expropriation in the Hungarian
Holocaust take these cases outside the domestic takings rule and its foundations. Genocide, the complaints here clearly imply, can be an expensive proposition. Expropriating property from the targets of
genocide has the ghoulishly efficient result of both
paying for the costs associated with a systematic attempt to murder an entire people and leaving destitute any who manage to survive. The expropriations
alleged by plaintiffs in these cases—the freezing of
bank accounts, the straw-man control of corporations, the looting of safe deposit boxes and suitcases
brought by Jews to the train stations, and even charging third-class train fares to victims being sent to
death camps—should be viewed, at least on the
pleadings, as an integral part of the genocidal plan to
depopulate Hungary of its Jews. The expropriations
thus effectuated genocide in two ways. They funded
the transport and murder of Hungarian Jews, and
they impoverished those who survived, depriving
them of the financial means to reconstitute their lives
and former communities.308
That court concluded that given the uniform condemnation of
genocide, it did not “believe the domestic takings rule can be used
to require courts to turn a blind eye to the means used to carry out

306

De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir.

1985).
307
308

Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 675.
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those ends—in this case, widespread expropriation of victims’ property to fund and accomplish the genocide itself.”309 The D.C. Circuit
took the same stance in its 2016 Simon v. Republic of Hungary decision.310
In summary, the position of those U.S. courts that have most directly addressed the status of an alleged human right to property protection is not different from that suggested by Lauterpacht back in
1945. Even now, some twenty years after the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, the Eleventh Circuit and other U.S. federal courts continue to
conclude, at least by way of dicta, that international human rights
law does not exist or that, even if does, that law does not extend to
protecting property rights of all human beings, except perhaps in the
unusual case where deprivations of property are used as tools to
commit genocide.311 The Mezerhane Court found not only that Venezuela’s purported violation of the American Convention of Human
Rights (which contains a right to property) does not constitute a “violation of international law” as demanded by the FSIA, but, that the
human rights revolution prompted by the adoption of the international bill of rights and the number of human rights instruments
listed in the Appendix never happened.312 That court drew upon
prior domestic takings rulings by U.S. courts to say that international

309

Id. at 676.
See Simon, 812 F.3d at 144–46. Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court,
faced with a D.C. circuit decision that decided to proceed with an FSIA claim
against Venezuela for an alleged discriminatory taking of property on the basis
that such a claim was “not frivolous,” remanded the case on the basis that courts
need to determine at the threshold, for purposes of upholding jurisdiction, whether
an expropriation in violation of international law has been committed and not only
that this might have occurred. The Court did not decide whether a discriminatory
taking of a state’s own nationals’ property violated international law but indicated
that “there are fair arguments to be made that a sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property sometimes amounts to an expropriation that violates international law . . . .” Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l
Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1321 (2017).
311
See, e.g., Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545,
551 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Chuidian v. Philippine
Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar v.
Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
312
Mezerhane, 785 F.3d at 546, 549–51.
310
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law only regulates the actions of states vis-à-vis one another and
does not address what a state does internally, to its own citizens.313
The courts of the nation that have, since the time of Alexander
Hamilton, been among the most forceful proponents of internationalizing property protections remain hostile to the idea, except when
“domestic takings” accompany genocide or when the deprivation of
property is directed at a U.S. national and the stolen property is located in the United States. These rulings share few commonalities
with those by the IACtHR, canvassed in Part III, in which international law is used as a license to scrutinize and often trump domestic
property rules that intrude on the property rights of a state’s own
citizens. While there is a greater similarity in terms of result between
U.S. court rulings involving “genocidal takings” and some of the
IACtHR’s decisions involving cases of “special gravity,” the suggestion made by U.S. courts that only property deprivations involving genocide (presumably because only these implicate violations of
genuine human rights like the right to life) violate international law
is not supported by the IACtHR, and of course, such statements ignore the property protecting human rights instruments in the Appendix. None of those treaties suggest that the property rights of nationals, indigenous peoples, aliens, or others are lesser rights that only
become international law breaches when the state committing the
property violation is also violating other presumably more serious
human rights.
It is, of course, understandable that U.S. judges do not want to
take jurisdiction over complaints against foreign governments that
have no connection to the United States. As judges indicate in many
of these cases, they do not want to turn U.S. courts into all-purpose
forums for foreign takings and certainly do not want to license foreign courts to do the same and second guess U.S. government decisions with no direct connection to their territory or their nationals.
But, as the FSIA case law makes clear, there are many routes to dismissing such claims from U.S. courts. Jurisdiction over such claims
can be denied by, for example, interpreting the FSIA to encompass
only violations of international law with a “commercial” or other
nexus to the United States, through the use of other doctrines (e.g.,
the Act of State doctrine or failure to exhaust local remedies), or the
313

Id. at 550.
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deployment of other U.S. statutes (e.g., the Hickenlooper Amendment).314 One could even imagine a narrow reading of the FSIA’s
reference to “international law” to refer only to “customary international law.” If so, U.S. courts that dismiss “domestic takings” lawsuits would only be finding that they have not been convinced that
customary international law has evolved to the point of protecting
the property of a state’s own nationals and not just foreign investors.315 But the statements in cases like Mezerhane are far broader
and suggest, in defiance of clear evidence to the contrary, that international law (treaty or customary) does not impose duties on a state
with respect to its own citizens or that only genocidal deprivations
of property do so.
V.

WHAT THE HUMAN RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS (AND ISN’T)

Part III suggests a number of generalizations about the property
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Article 21 of the American Convention of Human Rights, as interpreted by the IACtHR, the body
charged with its interpretation, protects both communal and private
property and extends its protections to certain groups (indigenous
peoples) as well as individuals. These rights include the right for
individuals to be fairly compensated for government deprivations of
property and, at least on some occasions, to have not only equal eligibility to own property, but to actually enjoy its possession and
use. The protections accorded to property under the American Convention, as interpreted by the Court, have evolved over time in ac-

314

For discussion of these possibilities, see, e.g., Todd Grabarsky, Note, Comity of Errors: The Overemphasis of Plaintiff Citizenship in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act “Takings Exception” Jurisprudence, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 240
(2011).
315
Even within Europe, there has not always been a consensus that the “general principles of international law,” referred to in Protocol to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol to the Convention], apply where a state
has taken property from its own nationals. See, e.g., Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for “Regulatory Expropriations” of the Property of Foreign Investors,
11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 148, 161 (2002) (discussing the position taken by the
ECHR’s Commission in Gudmundsson v. Iceland and by the ECtHR in later
cases). See also infra Conclusion.
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cordance with the Court’s view of the Convention as a “living instrument” responsive to changing technology, changing national
laws establishing certain entitlements, and other “current living conditions” within the region’s democracies.316 Through 2017, this
means that undefined “property” given protection under Article 21
has been seen as extending to “sacred” lands farmed (but not formally owned) by identified indigenous peoples, some forms of intellectual property, certain rights enjoyed by corporate shareholders,
tangibles seized from individuals in the course of law enforcement
and civil forfeiture, and forms of “acquired rights” established under
national laws (such as pensions). In designating these protected
forms of property, that Court has treated as relevant the economic,
social, and “affective” associations formed between the property
and persons,317 the expectations for continued enjoyment of property established under national law on behalf of either groups or individuals,318 the satisfaction of due process requirements established
under the rule of law within established democracies,319 and presumed connections between the freedom to work and the right to
secure the benefits of one’s labor.320 Whether a claimant enjoys
“first possession” of the property in question or even has formal title
to it has not always proven determinative.321 As this suggests, while
the Court has often been concerned with ensuring that individuals
receive equal treatment with respect to property under national law,
its determinations that property rights have been breached have not
been limited to cases of discrimination. Although the hurdles to

316
Mayangna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 146 (Aug. 31, 2001).
317
See, e.g., id. ¶ 149; Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
252, ¶ 180 (Oct. 25, 2012); Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
148, ¶ 178 (July 1, 2006).
318
See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text.
319
See, e.g., Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection and Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 56 (May 2, 2008).
320
See, e.g., Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶¶ 102–03 (Nov. 22, 2005).
321
See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (Mar. 29,
2006).
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reaching the IACtHR are formidable and subject to interminable delays, the few property rights claims that reach the Court often result
in considerable scrutiny over national laws and practices under
which the Court has found a number of state actions to be defective.
The application of Article 21 has led to a second, supra-national
look at even politically sensitive actions taken by governments in
response to crime or economic or other crises.322 In such cases the
Court has noted that property rights are “not absolute” and need to
be judged relative to any competing rights of distinct groups of persons—as well as the right of governments to regulate in the public
interest.323 The IACtHR accepts that, as Louis Henkin acknowledged, “[f]ew, if any, human rights are absolute[,]” and that even
human rights may bow to compelling public interests.324 In undertaking this balancing, the Court appears to proceed on a “case by
case” basis in which a number of factors (e.g., burdens of proof in
criminal cases, the relative poverty of the claimant, or the seriousness of the property deprivation) are considered both for purposes
of determining whether a treaty breach has occurred as well as to
decide the appropriate remedy.
The IACtHR’s approach to states’ corresponding duties encompasses a wealth of “positive” and not just “negative” duties on government. Some might suggest that it has more in common with the
German constitutional tradition which sees property rights, as Alexander described it, “not [as] a Lockean right, but a right that fuses
the traditions of Kantian liberalism and civic republicanism.”325
Whether or not this is the case, the IACtHR’s jurisprudence is
starkly different from U.S. Indian law jurisprudence or even U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence involving direct or indirect takings.326

322

See, e.g., Furlan & Family v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 222
(Aug. 31, 2012).
323
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
324
Louis Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, 506
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11 (1989). For examples, see supra Part
II, particularly the expropriation cases at Section III.B.2.a.
325
Alexander, supra note 45, at 739.
326
Scholarly analysis of both is voluminous. On U.S. Indian law, see FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, 2 THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984). For introductions to U.S. takings jurisprudence
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Under the IACtHR’s case law, governments are not expected merely
to refrain from doing harm to property (as by refraining from expropriations), rather they may be expected to be more proactively protective of property to the extent vulnerable groups (such as those
living in poverty) are affected. Further, governments subject to that
Court’s scrutiny may not satisfy their property rights obligations
merely by making available certain judicial remedies. Depending on
the property right at stake, governments may be expected to satisfy
legitimate expectations generated by prior laws that establish, for
example, entitlements to pensions at a certain level. States’ duties to
protect some forms of property (such as the historic rights of indigenous peoples) are perceived to overlap with their affirmative obligations to satisfy basic human needs, as for shelter and access to
natural resources. Further, consistent with the demands of Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,327 the
IACtHR has argued that states’ property obligations may also be affected by their other obligations (e.g., as under the ILC Convention
No. 169, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR), but that such treaties (such
as the Germany-Paraguay Bilateral Investment Treaty) cannot be
used to undermine the human rights commitments made under the
American Convention.328 While on rare occasion (as with respect to
communal lands) the Court has required restitution of specific lands,
in most instances it has been satisfied with other remedies, including, but not limited to, compensation.329
The Inter-American regime is only one of twenty-one instruments listed in the Appendix that most would identify as “human

from different perspectives, see EPSTEIN, supra note 81, at 347–66; Carol M.
Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 329 (1996).
327
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.A. 339 (authorizing treaty interpreters to consider “relevant rules of
international law”).
328
See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 140 (Mar. 29,
2006). It is not clear that national courts in general or that other international
courts would adhere to this particular prioritization among the property rights instruments identified in the Appendix.
329
Id. ¶ 226.
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rights” instruments.330 It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider how many of the above generalizations of the IACtHR’s property rights jurisprudence apply to the other twenty instruments in the
Appendix that include property rights within their human rights protections. What can be said with more certainty is that, despite the
IACtHR’s frequent references to the case law of the ECtHR,331 for
a number of reasons its own property jurisprudence is not likely to
be identical to that of the ECtHR (or, as is evident, that of the U.S.
Supreme Court). Divergent interpretations are likely due to the IACtHR’s occasional reliance on the particular negotiating history (and
texts) of the American Convention; frequent resort to the national
laws, national traditions, and legal practices common to American
states to complement its interpretation of the requirements of the
vague property rights in the Convention; and efforts to emulate, in
its own jurisprudence, the hemisphere’s historic reverence for giving effect to the affirmative obligations of states to satisfy “essential
needs.”332
The IACtHR also has had to confront property claims that involve “special gravity,”333 involving violent deprivations and loss of
life at a considerable remove from the more quotidian property violations that the ECtHR has most often considered. The IACtHR has
The “human rights” instruments for purposes of this Article are numbers
5–6, 8–11, 13–15, 19–20, 23–26, 30–31, and 33–35 in the Appendix. They range,
in chronological order by date of conclusion, from the oldest, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man (both from 1948), to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (from 2012).
Of course, some might consider other instruments in the Appendix as protective
of “human rights” depending on one’s definition of the term. See infra Appendix.
331
The IACtHR has relied on ECtHR rulings for the proposition, for example,
that human rights instruments like the American Convention are “liv[ing] instruments” that evolve over time. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 125
(June 31, 2005).
332
Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man art. 23, May 2, 1948, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev.
6, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 (1992). For this reason, it is
possible that the IACtHR might find more commonalities with the ways the German Constitutional Court has evolved the property right in the German Constitution. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 742 (emphasizing the German court’s
efforts to balance property rights with the state’s needs to fulfill basic needs).
333
See, e.g., Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 169.
330
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needed to evolve its own jurisprudence to address such grave
cases—and the prospect of greater resistance to its rulings in such
cases. It has also needed to evolve its own creative property rights
jurisprudence in response to claims made by distinctive indigenous
peoples within the Americas. At the same time, the luxury of not
having to address particularly grave deprivations of property rights
has enabled the ECtHR to focus, with more care, on the procedural
elements of due process that property rights holders enjoy.334 Moreover, even some of the interpretative rules that might be seen as encouraging harmonized interpretations of human rights law, such as
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises
(“VCT”), may not have that effect since some other treaties used to
interpret the American Convention, like the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention No. 169, play no comparable role in the ECtHR.335
For all these reasons, neither the ECtHR nor the IACtHR—the
two regional human rights courts most attentive to the human right
of property—should be seen as producing harmonious property
rights jurisprudence, and those courts’ respective case law cannot be
presumed to indicate the parameters of “the international law of
property” applicable to the world. As is suggested by the diverse
objects and purposes evident among the instruments in the Appendix—and the absence of a single comprehensive property treaty on
This helps to explain one of the appeals of the ECtHR’s case law to other
international adjudicators looking for applicable procedural standards. See, e.g.,
José E. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) of European Human Rights Law in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 519, 571–86 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2017). Of course,
there are other differences between the two courts with respect to property rights.
For example, while the ECtHR’s Protocol I, Article 1 explicitly extends its property protections to both “natural and legal persons,” the IACtHR has, as a matter
of interpretation, recognized only certain property rights protections on behalf of
corporate shareholders. See, e.g., Granier y Otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) v.
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293, ¶ 64 (June 22, 2015).
335
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 327, art. 31. But the
possibility that interpreters may resort to Art. 31(3)(c) (and other arguments) to
draw from other treaties that deal with property rights for purposes of interpreting
the human rights instruments in the Appendix means that the other property respecting instruments in that Appendix that are not considered human rights treaties may sometimes be used to assist the interpretation of treaties like the ACHR.
334
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point—there is no such thing as a single global regime for property
protection. The sheer diversity of these instruments and the forums
charged with interpreting them impose formidable obstacles towards reaching such a goal, even if such a prospect were desirable.
Indeed, even the twenty-one instruments whose titles suggest that
they deal with “human rights” contained in the Appendix differ to
some extent among themselves. The non-regional human rights treaties included, such as CEDAW and CERD, for example, encompass
only non-discrimination guarantees with respect to property and
only provide access for individual claimants to committees of experts that are not formally delegated the power to issue legally binding judgments.336 Further, the Appendix of “select” texts understates
the sheer diversity of relevant international instruments; it only includes documents which explicitly identify “property” as their subject.337 It does not include treaties, like the ICESCR, that include
rights to other things that might plausibly be seen as species of
“property,” such as the right to shelter, food, or medical care.338 Nor
does the Appendix include compacts that guard “security” interests
in things, such as vessels or minerals extracted from the deep seabed
as regulated under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea

336

See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Economic Consequences of Marriage, Family Relations and Their Dissolution), ¶¶ 37–38, 55 U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GC/29 (Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter General Recommendation on Article 16].
337
Note that the European Convention of Human Rights is included because
even though the first paragraph of Art. 1, Protocol 1 extends to the enjoyment of
one’s “possessions,” “property” is mentioned in the second paragraph of that provision and the ECtHR has made clear that Art. 1 protects the right to property as
broadly understood. See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 63
(1979) (drawing from the rest of the text of the Article as well as its travaux
préparatoires the conclusion that this provision “is in substance guaranteeing the
right of property”).
338
Indeed, many would find it more intuitively appealing to include, under the
“human right of property,” such treaties even though they do not identify these as
“property.” See generally Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶
27–28 (Nov. 28, 2007).
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(UNCLOS) and the “Mining Code” issue by the International Seabed Authority, even though these are undoubtedly a species of property rights.339
The Appendix also does not include the over 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and free trade agreements (collectively
“IIAs”) that include protections for foreign investments and investors. These treaties do not adhere to a single text and despite some
generally common provisions, differ among themselves in terms of
the precise rights conferred.340 Inclusion of this number of treaties
would vastly eclipse the others in the Appendix. As a placeholder
for the widespread international investment regime—which includes some 180 states that are parties to at least one BIT—the Appendix includes only one such treaty, Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.
That treaty, like many other IIAs, protects not only investments (including corporations) but individual investors, including shareholders whose holdings may be entirely wiped out if a state expropriates
a company.341 There is no question that IIAs like NAFTA protect
property rights, albeit only those held by certain foreign investors.
Indeed, international law rules (including rules of customary international law such as the “international minimum standard” and the
duty to pay “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation” in case
of expropriation) designed to protect the property rights of foreign
investors emerged before many of the other treaties in the Appendix—including the human rights instruments listed.342
Another obstacle to elaborating a unified human right of property is the fact that international lawyers do not agree even on what
339

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 133–37, 153,
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY,
https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code/Regulations (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
While Article 136 of UNCLOS determines that the deep seabed and its resources
are the “common heritage of mankind,” states such as the United States resist the
conclusion that this means that these are “common” or “communal” property.
Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena
for Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 214–16 (1992) (discussing
U.S. interpretation of “common heritage of mankind”).
340
See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?, 7 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 534, 557–58 (2016).
341
NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 1110.
342
See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
17, 18–19, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Alvarez, A BIT on Custom].
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a “human right treaty” is, for purposes of distinguishing among international instruments. The suggestion made here that twenty-one
of the texts in the Appendix are “traditionally” seen as human rights
instruments (based on their titles) sidesteps the absence of such a
definition. Not everyone agrees, for example, that treaties that protect foreign investors (either as individuals or as corporate legal persons) should be seen as protective of “human” rights.343 Whether
some instruments in the Appendix should be considered human
rights instruments even when the texts (or titles) of such treaties
make no such reference may turn on whether, for example, such a
treaty intends to recognize as a third party beneficiary a human being, and endows such persons rights to bring their own claims for
breach before some kind of adjudicator. If that is what a “human
rights treaty” is, agreements as varied as the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, and many IIAs (apart from NAFTA) could be
so classified.344 But if the universe of “human rights” treaties is confined only to those that enable individual claims to be brought before
international courts capable of issuing legally binding determinations without the need for the individual’s home state to intercede,
and without the possibility that this home state can “waive” or otherwise undermine such claims once brought, only a handful of the
instruments in the Appendix can be so classified.345 Indeed, this narrow definition—intended to demarcate rights that are truly inalienable and genuinely enforceable would exclude all the U.N. human
rights instruments in the Appendix, including CEDAW and CERD,
since these enable individual complaints to be heard only before
committees with no authority to issue legally binding rulings. That
See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International
Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (2011); See generally Alvarez, supra note
334, at 571.
344
This proved to be a contentious question before the International Court of
Justice. See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment,
2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 15 (Mar. 31).
345
See generally Raz, supra note 60, at 223 (articulating a position that comes
close to adopting this strict view of enforceability as necessary for a genuine human rights international obligation to exist); see also David Miller, Joseph Raz on
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 232–34 (criticizing Raz’s definition as being
inconsistent with the diverse remedies available within international regimes and
with the uses to which international law is put).
343
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definition would also exclude NAFTA’s investment chapter, which
permits its state parties to issue binding interpretations that can undermine even investor claims that have been submitted to investorstate arbitration.346
All of these suggest the many things that the human right of
property is not. The human right of property is not one idea but
many. The property jurisprudence of the IACtHR presented in Part
III is only one example of what the internationalization of property
rights has meant. Anyone seeking to understand more fully what the
human right of property means would need to explore the commonalities (and differences) among the regional human rights regimes
that have generated property rights jurisprudence, as well as those
multilateral regimes in the Appendix that might plausibly be seen as
addressing human rights. The 130 states that are parties to the principal four regional human rights treaties, the additional three states
that are parties to the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the 189
countries (including the United States) that are state parties to at
least one treaty that prohibits discrimination with respect to property
(such as CEDAW or CERD) have accepted the idea that a human
right to property protection exists as a matter of black letter treaty
obligation—even as its instantiation has been left to regime-by-regime elaboration.347
The diversity of the instruments in the Appendix indicate that
states have long been aware that the concept of property—and of an
individual’s right to it—is deeply contested both within societies
and naturally among them.348 Numerous failed attempts to craft
346

NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 1131.
As indicated in the Appendix, 45 states are parties to Protocol I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 are parties to the American Convention of Human Rights, 39 states are
parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 22 are parties
to the Arab Charter on Human Rights (for a total of 130). The Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (not included in the Appendix) has been ratified by Belarus, Kyrgyzstan,
the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. See, e.g., Andrei Richter, Commonwealth
of Independent States Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protection/migration/4de4eef19/cis-convention-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms.html.
348
See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 58, at 30 (“The objects of property—the
things which in lay usage are capable of being owned—differ so radically in legal
347
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comprehensive multilateral rules regarding even a subpart of this
subject—namely the treatment that states owe the property of foreign investors under international law—have provided states with
abject lessons about the difficulties of overcoming these differences
among all states.349 The distinct instruments in the Appendix, ratified by separate numbers and groups of states, are the product of the
sheer difficulty of such an undertaking on a global scale. What the
IACtHR has begun to do with respect to most states of the Americas
is to delineate with some greater precision in the context of a single
treaty what constitutes protected forms of common, communal, and
private property, specify what it means for groups and individuals
to enjoy these rights, and delineate state responsibilities applicable
to each form of protected property.
To the extent claims of international property rights are
grounded in the instruments in the Appendix, and not on universally
applicable customary rules or general principles of law,350 the treaty
basis of the international right of property protection provides one
answer to sovereigntists who object to the very idea of internationalized property rights. Sovereignty is not a fatal objection to the extent states remain free to ratify (and even to withdraw from) property-protective treaties. The à la carte and treaty-based nature of international property rights means that this capacious right remains
responsive to sovereign consent—and, at least to this extent, to the
discrete needs, cultures, and historic traditions of nations. Even
those instruments in the Appendix designated as protecting “human
rights” differ on the types of “property” they protect, the kind of
limitations they impose on states, and the forums (and enforceable
remedies) anticipated to handle breaches of their terms. These dis-

theory, that it seems unlikely that the same concept of ownership could be applied
to them all, even within a single legal system.”). Nonetheless, in his book, Waldron proceeds to provide a right-based argument for a right to private property.
See id. at 62–105.
349
For one such ambitious attempt, see Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J.
INT’L L. 545, 547 (1961) (an attempt to develop a “draft convention” on the subject).
350
For efforts to address whether the right to property exists as a rule of custom or as a general principle of law, see Sprankling, supra note 13, at 485–88,
and Weiler Report, supra note 299, at 8. See also infra Conclusion.
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tinctions—which, to be sure, enable and even encourage the “fragmentation” of the law and undermine stable expectations and the
predictability of the underlying rules—understandably generate
suggestions for remedying this threat to international law’s unity (as
through a global pact). But the fragmented nature of internationalized property rights—and even the contained uncertainty of whether
some treaties define them as “human rights”—can be seen as a
strength and not a flaw. The capacity of states to pick and choose
among property rights and for each treaty regime to define them over
time is international law’s (predictable) way of responding to the
complexity of property rules as well as to concerns about the prospects for undermining “sovereignty,” including self-determination.
The design features of these treaties help explain the substantive
property rights that they contain. Instruments that were originally
intended to be merely hortatory, such as the U.N. General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (both from 1948), could
afford to proclaim the right to property in the broadest (and vaguest)
of terms—after all, these rights were not intended for direct application in a court of law.351 But even the property rights texts of these
contemporaneous declarations show some sensitivity to distinct
concerns for sovereignty. As would be expected of the more diverse
membership of the U.N.’s General Assembly, which in 1948 included both communist and capitalist governments, the Universal
Declaration’s Article 17 is strikingly non–specific with respect to
the right to “own” property, extending that right without distinction
to personal, as well as other forms of property.352 Article 17’s constraint on government takings is also minimal: its only restriction is

“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, supra note 17, art. 17. “Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity
of the individual and of the home.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, supra note 332, art. 23.
352
As Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann points out, the division between socialist
and capitalist states during the Cold War, which explains both the absence of a
property right in the 1966 Covenants as well as the vagueness in Article 17 of the
Universal Declaration, was over whether international law should recognize all
forms of property (including communal and common) or merely the right to per351
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that such deprivations cannot be “arbitrary.”353 As the negotiating
history of the Universal Declaration indicates, a more detailed draft
proposed by the Human Rights Commission that would have specifically recognized the right to own personal property and that
spelled out more particular limits on its deprivation (including the
need to do so for the “public welfare” and with “just compensation”)
was rejected.354 As a leading commentary on Article 17 indicates, it
is possible to infer (but it is not altogether certain) that the drafters
of the Universal Declaration sought to make the taking of property
by a state without compensation, by definition, “arbitrary” and
therefore illegal; it is a bit clearer, based on the Declaration’s simultaneous prohibitions on discrimination based on “other status,”
that distinctions based on owning property (such as to vote) would
violate the Declaration’s Articles 2 and 7.355 As noted, the American
Declaration’s comparable right, though similarly vague, reflects
strong sentiments prevailing in the hemisphere in favor of using law
to defend “essential needs.”356
The property rights provision in the ECHR and the subsequent
caselaw of the ECtHR suggests the greater depth of protection that
is sometimes possible within a region with greater shared historical,

sonal property (along with the right of compensation for deprivations of it). Communist states did not oppose mention of property rights as such. See Howard–
Hassmann, supra note 55, at 181–83.
353
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 17, art. 17 (“No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.”).
354
The rejected text stated: “Everyone has the right to own personal property.
No one shall be deprived of his property except for public welfare and with just
compensation. The State may determine those things, rights and enterprises, that
are susceptible of private appropriation and regulate the acquisition and use of
such property.” Alfredsson, supra note 17, at 256. Also rejected was a proposed
text by a U.N. Working Group that bore some resemblance to the text ultimately
adopted in the OAS insofar as it too restricted the right to own property “as meets
the essential needs of decent living, that helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home . . . .” Id.
355
Id. at 256–57 (suggesting that distinctions made on the basis of property
ownership or lack thereof would violate Article 2 as well as the right to equal
protection under the laws in Article 7).
356
See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 117–21 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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cultural, and legal traditions.357 The ECHR accepts the right to enjoy
undefined possessions for both individuals and legal persons like
corporations; along with the right not to be deprived of these except
for generalized and legitimate public reasons subject to the rule of
law—and enables individuals, including a state’s own citizens, to
file claims before an international court to protect these rights and
ensure compensation under binding rulings that can second guess
domestic laws and courts. The ECtHR has developed the largest
body of property case law of any international court. Of the 19,570
rulings that it issued between 1959 and 2016, 3,098—roughly one
in six—involved claims under the right to property.358 The European
countries that have traditionally had the greatest number of property
claims brought against them have been Turkey, Russia, Romania,
and Italy.359 The number of ECtHR rulings addressing the right to
property increased dramatically after states engaged in democratic
transitions in Eastern Europe—whose histories were different than
those of Western Europe—joined the Court. Yet, even in Europe,
the right to property is among the most violated provisions of the
ECtHR—ranked third from 1959 through 2016, behind alleged denials of right to liberty and security, claims of inhumane/degrading
treatment, and denials of rights to fair trial.360
The human rights instruments in the Appendix do not insist, as
would the strongest defenders of private property rights like Hernando de Soto, that the only route to economic development lies in
allocating private title to holders of land.361 Instruments like the
American Convention purport to protect the human right of property, not simply “private” property.362 This has enabled the IACtHR,

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” Protocol to the Convention, supra note 315, art. 1.
358
ECTHR OVERVIEW, supra note 142, at 9.
359
Id. at 8–9.
360
Id. at 7.
361
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 49–51 (2000).
362
ACHR, supra note 140, art. 21.
357
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as noted, to embrace certain communal rights.363 And while a number of these treaties are fully compatible with and may even presume
the existence of a liberal and democratic market state, these instruments do not generally require recognition of “entrepreneurial freedom,”364 “freedom of commerce,”365 or a right to democracy.366 In
theory and in fact (given the diversity of states that have ratified
many of these treaties), these instruments extend to all forms of government and presumptively accommodate diverse approaches to allocating the powers of the state versus the market. Some international property rights regimes may be components of the “Washington Consensus” or of misguided efforts to promote privatization or
to encourage forms of “good governance” compatible with the desires of certain hegemonic states, but the diverse property instruments in the Appendix should not be conflated with these efforts.
Despite the historical connections between some of these treaties
and certain hegemonic powers, such as the rise of IIAs and influence
of the United States addressed in Part II, contemporary international
property protections do not merely reproduce a particular kind of
free market ideology.
Consider the ways that international law has increasingly come
to recognize the many ways national property laws and practices
subject women to unequal treatment. CEDAW reframes property
rights by targeting the specific ways that women’s property rights
have been violated—e.g., during marriage and divorce and inheritance.367 Today’s ever-evolving understanding of the diverse ways
363
See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 146 (June 27,
2012); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118, 121 (Mar. 29,
2006); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001).
364
See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 1536–40 (2d ed. 2009)
(including, as a contested potential human right, “freedom of enterprise”).
365
But see LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 164 (rejecting the idea of including the freedom “to buy and to sell” within his bill of rights).
366
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992).
367
Under Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW, states “shall give women equal
rights to conclude contracts and to administer property” and “shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating
to marriage and family relations,” in particular to extend “[t]he same rights for
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that national laws, cultural and religious practices make women less
than human, deny them the full potential for self-realization, and
treat them as objects in defiance of Kant’s categorical imperative is
at least in part the result of the elaboration of equality instruments
like CEDAW. We have become ever more aware of the absence of
genuine equality for women thanks to interactions between
CEDAW-initiated practices and those of other human rights instruments.368 Interpretations by the CEDAW committee recognizing the
interaction between Articles 23.4 of the ICCPR (requiring states to
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses) and Article
16.1 of CEDAW (containing a similar demand but also directing
states specifically to respect property rights in connection with marriage and family relations), for example, have enabled a greater understanding of how women are unfairly treated in terms of the distribution of property rights between husband and wife, and between
widows and their husbands’ relatives and surviving children (including the rights of daughters).369
both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property . . . .” Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.
20378 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. See also Rep. of
the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/38, at vii–xv, (Apr. 12, 1994) (adopting commentary to elaborate on Articles 9, 15, and 16 of CEDAW to enable “equality in marriage and family relations”).
368
For one example of how the CEDAW Committee’s scrutiny of national
laws has furthered the interpretation of the rights in that Convention that relate to
property rights, see Savitri W.E. Goonesekere, Article 15, in THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN 388–407 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf eds.,
2012). See also Marsha A. Freeman, Article 16, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 432–36.
369
See, e.g., General Recommendation on Article 16, supra note 336, ¶¶ 10–
11 (criticizing the fact that the constitutions and laws of a number of states still
provide that personal status laws, such as those governing the distribution of marital property, are exempt from scrutiny for non-discrimination); id. ¶¶ 25–26 (noting that marriage registration protects the rights of spouses with regard to property); id. ¶¶ 34–35 (noting the need for protecting women with respect to prenuptial and postnuptial agreements dealing with property); id. ¶¶ 36–38 (calling for
attention to discriminatory systems of property management during marriage); id.
¶¶ 43–48 (calling for equality with respect to legal arrangements for distribution
of property after divorce or separation); id. ¶¶ 49–53 (calling for non-discriminatory treatment of widows with respect to property rights after death of their
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The specificity of the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 21 on these topics—its “attention to ways in which
family relations, distribution of work and responsibilities in the
household, and gender stereotypes can cause bias in the distribution
of property rights between spouses”370—has encouraged human
rights advocates to challenge the “double vulnerability” that women
face with respect to remaining secure in their homes, insofar as their
right to access to land and housing are challenged not only by national laws that fail to treat them equally, but also by embedded practices that emphasize male lineage with respect to tenure, inheritance,
and even their right to their names.371 The specialized attention to
gender equality prompted by the adoption of CEDAW, along with
the gender mainstreaming in U.N. institutions that it has encouraged,
has enabled international law to begin to address the many ways that
international and national laws have fallen short of ensuring equal
treatment for men and women. These flaws include the traditional
“public/private” distinctions embedded in international rules, their
focus on formal but not substantive equality, the presumption of
male-headed households, and the emphasis on only some forms of
spouses, including changes to customary rules permitting widows and her children
to be dispossessed of their property, survivorship rights with respect to pensions
and disability, and rules regarding the making of wills to override discriminatory
laws). See generally Ingunn Ikdahl, Property and Security: Articulating Women’s
Rights to Their Homes, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: CEDAW IN
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 268, 268 (Anne Hellum & Henriette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013). As Ikdahl points out, CEDAW’s efforts on behalf of equal inheritance rights for daughters have been supported by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 275–77 (citing Comm. on the Rights of
the Child, General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, ¶ 33,
U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (Mar. 17, 2003)); see also Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 25,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 10 (Mar. 29, 2000) (noting that to fulfill their
obligations with respect to ensuring the equality of spouses under Art. 23(4),
states need to accord equal rights with respect to the “ownership or administration
of property, whether common property or property in the sole ownership of either
spouse”); id. ¶ 30 (noting that “[d]iscrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on other grounds such as . . . property”).
370
Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 272–73.
371
Id. at 271–77. For examples of national laws that now come under scrutiny
by U.N. human rights committees and U.N. special rapporteurs, see, e.g., Janet
Walsh, Women’s Property Rights Violations in Kenya, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 133.
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financial contributions to marital property. These shortcomings, often shared with national laws, have harmed not only the rights of
women, but have undermined efforts to promote sustainable development.372
Thanks to treaties like CEDAW as well as developments in other
rights regimes, it is increasingly accepted (including within international financial institutions) that “[t]he pursuit of gender empowerment without attention to the distribution of land is an enterprise that
is fatally hobbled from the outset as, for a large percentage of the
world’s population, real assets come primarily in the form of entitlements to land.”373 Attention to the intersection between gender
and property—and the intersectional insights produced by considering that interaction—is challenging assumptions, including within
institutions like the World Bank, that only property regimes requiring privatization and de-regulation as well as individualized and
property titles are desirable.374 Kerry Rittich points out that the
growing attention to gender equality is contesting traditional approaches to how (or whether) property rights need to be secured.375
CEDAW’s insistence on contextualizing how property rights relate
to the unequal status of women and girls—its committee’s insistence
on “accommodating differences” not only between men and women
but between different women (and girls) in different places and
time—even casts doubt on the wisdom of uniform property rules.376
The specific attention to how property and gender intersects enabled
by CEDAW has allowed policymakers who are willing to listen to
become more aware of the different ways that one can achieve
372

See generally Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 289; Karen O. Mason & Helene
M. Carlsson, The Development Impact of Gender Equality in Land Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 114.
373
Rittich, supra note 43, at 88. The literature on the deep connections between equality of land rights and development is substantial. See, e.g., Mason &
Carlsson, supra note 371, at 114. Indeed, it has been mainstreamed into the work
of international financial institutions. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING
DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND
VOICE
xi
(2001),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/
Engendering_Development.pdf.
374
See, e.g., Rittich, supra note 43, at 88.
375
Id. at 89.
376
This has encouraged, for example, more attention to the special needs of
rural women and girls. See G.A. Res. 70/132, ¶ 2 (Dec. 17, 2015).
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greater security, certainty, and predictability without requiring formalization or individualization of title or the commodification of all
forms of property; notably, such efforts may require more, not less,
by way of careful government regulation.377
This critical take on property rights, which departs considerably
from the individualistic property jurisprudence of countries like the
United States, emerges from instruments like CEDAW and other
“equality” instruments in the Appendix. Instruments like CEDAW
require evaluating rights to property alongside the other equality
rights spelled out in the convention. They put property rights in the
context of the need to respect the equality rights of a particular vulnerable group and require that right to be treated as one among others.378 Such treaties, embedded in institutional settings that include
expert committees, special rapporteurs, periodic consideration of
state reports, annual re-visitations by the U.N. General Assembly,
and, where states have accepted optional protocols permitting individual complaints, expert committees, encourage continuous conversations on how property rights impact vulnerable groups.379 They
are, as the IACtHR would put it, “living instruments” for revisable
property rights.380

377

See Rittich, supra note 43, at 101–03. See generally Dehaibi, supra note
62, at 2 (arguing for a more “inclusive” human right to property that serves as a
tool for positive social action to satisfy basic needs).
378
CEDAW, supra note 366, arts. 15, 16. The CEDAW committee’s contextual property right might be seen, as is the case with the IACtHR’s, as more accommodating of the view, suggested by the positive obligations imposed by
CEDAW itself, that states need to take positive action to satisfy essential human
needs and that property rights need to be among those positive actions. Compare,
e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 736 (discussing German law), with Rory O’Connell, The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa,
6 INT’L J. CONSTITUTIONAL L. 267, 267 (2008) (discussing evolutions of the needs
demanded by substantive equality in those systems).
379
See e.g., CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 11.
380
Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 155 (July. 1,
2006). This means that matters that might have been originally omitted from treaty
texts in order to secure agreement—such as mention of inheritance rights in
CEDAW’s Article 16—may re-emerge in the course of later treaty interpretations.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 368, at 414.
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The progressive attention paid to accommodating disparities
among persons differentially situated—from women to the disabled—encouraged by the distinct human rights treaty regimes included in the Appendix has also inspired more critical takes on the
ways different national laws (e.g., dealing with family law and inheritance, contracts, land regulation, rules for titling and registration, or rules on immigration) affect such persons, as well as the
“devastating effects of property rights violations—including poverty, disease, violence, and homelessness[.]”381 Interactions among
these international regimes as well as within them have spurred human rights advocates to propose reforms to national laws and regulations that, left unchanged, would make the property rights of
women or minorities more vulnerable or even non-existent.382
To be sure, these property rights instruments, devised by states,
do not intrude on their sovereignty in equal respects.383 Critics of
IIAs are not wrong when they suggest such treaties, which usually
enable foreign investors to secure direct access to international arbitral remedies that are, by international standards, unusually effective, provide more credible remedies than most human rights treaties. It may indeed be true, as this author has suggested elsewhere,
that a foreign investor’s right to property is the most enforceable
“human right” in the canon.384 It is also true that even IIAs, much
less human rights instruments, like the American Convention of Human Rights, may fail to change national laws and practices in place
and do little to remedy systemic flaws in property rights protections
beyond the occasional high-profile case. They may fail to secure the
desired structural reforms sought by judges on international courts,
investor-state arbitrators, or members of U.N. expert bodies. But
these critical flaws—shared with other international legal regimes—
are also, from a different standpoint, their saving grace. These regimes’ notorious enforcement gaps, and express and implied exceptions, make the human right of property a malleable instrument that
does not always “trump” the state—or threaten its sovereignty. Textual weaknesses in CEDAW with respect to the actual requirements
381

Walsh, supra note 371, at 133.
See, e.g., Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 282–83 (noting how the interaction of
certain laws and practices render many women essentially homeless).
383
See infra, Appendix.
384
Alvarez, International Investment Law, supra note 24, at 61–62.
382
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imposed on states (e.g., the prevalence of hedge words like “all appropriate” throughout its text),385 abundant and broad reservations,
as well as the potential for outright defiance of the CEDAW committee’s non-binding views and recommendations, threatens to
make that treaty, as well as many others in the Appendix, toothless
tigers. But this weakness means that the threat that these human
rights treaties pose to legitimate sovereignty concerns should not be
exaggerated. Whatever it might be in IIAs (and its relatively effective arbitration system), the human right of property as applied in
places like the CEDAW committee is not a sword of Damocles
hanging over conscientious regulators bent on fulfilling the public
good.
Comparable sensitivity to sovereign concerns is suggested by
the remedies available to those seeking to enforce the human right
of property. That right, at least in the traditional human rights instruments contained in the Appendix, is literally a right of and not necessarily to property, even though the latter is how it is routinely (if
inaccurately) described in some of these instruments.386 While in
some cases, such as IACtHR rulings that grant indigenous peoples
access to particular ancestral lands or a U.S. court’s recognition that
a particular painting by Klimt, seized by the Nazis, belongs to the
Altmann family,387 international law requires granting certain persons title to particular lands or goods, in the vast majority of cases
where international legal regimes extend relief for property deprivations or other harms, that relief consists of some form of “just” or
“proportional” compensation or other forms of redress (including
perhaps merely an apology).388 International law instruments that
address property do not typically proclaim a right to acquire or to
have restored title to specific property and, in accord with their reluctance to award specific performance, it is extremely rare for an
international court to demand restitution of even unjustly expropriated property. As is clear from the IACtHR case law, except in very
385

CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 2.
For example, Article 21 is entitled “Right to Property” in the American
Convention. ACHR, supra note 140.
387
See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 281 (Aug. 24, 2010);
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 974 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other
grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
388
See Alvarez, Defense of Foreign Capital, supra note 92, at 7.
386
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rare circumstances, international law does not establish or secure a
right to specific property. This is true even when international law
establishes, alongside the substantive right to property protection,
an adjudicative mechanism capable of providing a legal remedy,
such as regional human rights courts. These courts have historically
been most attentive to securing the removal of states’ laws or practices that violate human rights, in accord with the view that their
principal function is to prevent future abuses of rights. Although the
increased attention to the right to an “effective remedy” (particularly
in the ECHR) may be changing things, historically, such courts have
been only secondarily attentive to the need to fully redress victims
for their injuries through just compensation, even with respect to
property rights.389
Adjudicative mechanisms charged with protecting property
rights do not adhere to a uniform view requiring damages that
amount to the full market value of the property. Regional human
rights courts—such as the European and Inter-American Courts—
do not necessarily take the same approach with respect to the extent
of compensation even when they find that some level of compensation is due. The judges of these courts exercise considerable discretion. Neither of these courts is obligated to award those who suffer
property deprivations the “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation that is often explicitly required under IIAs when property is
lost due to an expropriation.390 Moreover, nothing in international
law seems to require paying victims of property deprivations the full
value of the property as the victim has experienced it. While investor-state arbitrators may be more willing to grant considerable monetary relief to injured claimants than is the case for human rights
tribunals (and have at times been heavily criticized for it), even they
do not purport to compensate victims for the full subjective value of

389
For a fulsome description of the diverse (and competing) goals of regional
human rights courts, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS Law (1999).
390
It is also worth noting that there is some flexibility with respect to compensation even with respect to IIAs, particularly since those treaties generally do not
specify the level of compensation owed to those who suffer from property deprivations that do not involve the full taking of their property, such as a violation of
fair and equitable treatment.
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what was lost.391 The diverse (and sometimes unpredictable) remedies accorded to victims of property violations may correspond, in
part, to the different texts of the underlying treaties. Human rights
treaties, for example, usually affirm certain procedural rights with
respect to how individuals are treated alongside their property rights.
Treaties that protect individuals from “arbitrary” or discriminatory
treatment, with respect to some uses of property or in some contexts,
may result in remedial orders that only seek to ensure that a person
is accorded just treatment. To that extent as well it is more accurate
to say that international human rights instruments typically extend
protections of property rather than specifically to it.
VI. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHT OF
PROPERTY
What is the international lawyer’s response to the many profound critiques of property rights canvassed in Part I?392
The existence of an internationalized right to property protection
grounded in so many instruments might be seen as a piecemeal,
pragmatic effort to correct, by fits and starts and subject to some
reservations and the inevitable hypocrisy that characterizes all interstate human rights ventures, many of the objections to such a right
canvassed in Part I. Those involved in crafting these instruments
have said, in effect, “yes, the right to property has been used to exclude from its reach slaves, women, prisoners, and refugees as well
as to extend certain privileges only to those with property—but these
unconscionable mistakes can be corrected without abolishing the
only viable system that we have for organizing society and individual rights within it, namely schemes for allocating property rights.”
The predictable absence of universal consensus around a single text
recognizing a right to property protection has not precluded states
from elaborating and joining, in increasing numbers, compacts that
haltingly accept the proposition that all human beings—from those
who create intellectual property, to members of racial minorities,
391

See Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 119 (2002).
392
This section puts to one side the oft-addressed debate about whether discussion of fundamental imprescriptible rights, natural or otherwise, is, as Jeremy
Bentham suggested, “nonsense upon stilts.” WALDRON, supra note 58, at 16.
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women, prisoners, indigenous peoples and others who work the
land, migrants, refugees and stateless persons, and the disabled—
can only be fully human if their rights to property are respected without discrimination.393 International law, at least in the form of the
human rights instruments in the Appendix, recognizes that while it
is true that unequal distribution of property rights tends to follow the
lines of sex and race and that the right to property has, through much
of recorded history, privileged the urban rich over the rural poor, the
answer to these inequities is not to abolish the right to private property (even if that were possible). Nor is the answer to cede the subject entirely to the “domestic” realm ungoverned by international
law. The human rights instruments that include property protections
seek to expand the enjoyment of some property rights under the rule
of law where possible on a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary basis.
The instruments in the Appendix also begin to suggest how international law handles the balances that must be struck between individuals, and between individual and societal rights, whenever any
human right is recognized. While it is true that property rights are
notoriously grounded in excluding someone else from enjoying
what is one’s property—that, for example, the IACtHR’s finding
that the minority Sawhoyomaxa Community was entitled to certain
lands meant that others were thereby excluded from them—it is important to recognize that the recognition of any right (even one as
basic as free speech) imposes limits on the freedom of others, at least
to the extent that it imposes a duty on others not to violate those
rights.394 An absolutist free speech country like the United States
imposes a duty on all to at least tolerate (and not respond violently
to) even the most virulent repulsive hate speech, for example.395 International law’s acceptance of property rights reflects deep seated
needs—at the national and international levels—to establish a system of rights (and attendant) duties on others, including the right to
exclude.

393

See infra, Appendix.
See, e.g., Raz, supra note 60, at 220 (“Each right establishes a set of duties,
and identifies a set of people who are subject to the various duties.”).
395
See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
394
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Internationalized human rights of property—and the diversity of
treaties that they encompass—are also consistent with the idea that
all societies have various forms of common and communal property
and have the right to decide which types of property or possessions
fall into each. While the instruments in the Appendix presume that
all societies accept the basic institution of private property, they also
suggest, as a group, that the objects or lands that are subject to it
remain a contested concept (and are likely ever to be so). Contestations over what “property” is (e.g., whether it includes certain
rights/things, tangibles/intangibles, land/other immovables, waters/oceans, air space/outer space) and whether the property so designated for protection includes all or only some of the bundle of
rights associated with private property (e.g., the right to acquire, to
use, to destroy, to exclude, or to transfer) have not precluded discrete
agreements among states recognizing some forms of property rights
as such. 396 Treaties like CEDAW—accepted by virtually every
state—require at least non-discrimination with respect to property
rights. Of course, this variable geometry with respect to many human rights (apart from those that might be regarded as jus cogens)
is not unusual. Comparable disagreements have not precluded discrete international law agreements, including at the regional level,
with respect to other human rights, such as freedom of expression,
association, or economic rights to health or social security despite
severe differences of opinion among states about their contours and
meanings.397 It is up to each state to decide whether the “compromised” sovereignty entailed by adherence to any of these treaties is
worth the reputational or other benefits the treaty confers.398
As for the right of property itself, the utilitarian arguments for
its protection are familiar.399 Multilateral human rights instruments,
396

Cf. SPRANKLING, supra note 32, at 352–53 (dealing sequentially with all
of these distinctions).
397
See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 140, at arts. 13, 15; ICESCR, supra note 21,
at arts. 11, 12.
398
It is not clear that as a group, the property rights instruments in the Appendix uniformly endorse (or presume) either the “bundle of sticks” or the competing
“right to things” approaches that is common to the U.S. literature on property.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law & Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357 (2001).
399
For an effort to distinguish utilitarian defenses of private property from
moral or “right-based” contentions, see WALDRON, supra note 58, at 284–322.
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like CEDAW and CERD, seem premised on the idea that since
equality is essential to the rule of law, equal property rights are essential to it as well.400 Others, like the instruments on indigenous
peoples, on protecting wages or pensions, or the rights of performers, seek to achieve certain social justice goals. Those concerning
the treatment of refugees and stateless persons aspire to fulfill certain foundational notions of fairness. Several, particularly CEDAW,
rely, at least in part, on the need to promote economic development.
More generally, the drafters of the property rights provisions in the
human rights instruments in the Appendix in all probability assumed, like the Scholastics, that a right to personal property is essential to persons living in common because it generates and protects settled expectations, promotes diligence and efficiency, and deflects or avoids conflict. Utilitarian concerns certainly underlie
many of Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in Part II as well as many
of the rulings of the IACtHR canvassed in Part III.
The harms that these treaties seek to prevent or to remedy often
elicit more specific instrumental justifications. The right of property
is needed to protect all of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms.” 401 In appropriate contexts, the right to individual or communal property serves to protect persons from want, may ensure their
right to work and to benefit from it, enables freedom of expression,
and provides some protection from fearful attacks (particularly from
governmental forces). Some takings of property, like that of Mr.
Mezerhanes’ newspaper and TV station, require protection because
the underlying property was a vehicle for the freedom of expression
and providing recompense for taking such property might deter further media interventions.402 Some deprivations—as of communal
lands of those who live off of it or the cases of “special gravity”
considered by the IACtHR—require a remedy because of their intrinsic connections to basic human needs for food, shelter, and even
to life.403 Some takings, as of a family painting in Altmann v. Austria
400

CEDAW, supra note 367, art. 15.
See FDR and the Four Freedoms Speech, FDR PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. &
MUSEUM, https://fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
402
But see Mezerhane v. República Bolivarian De Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545,
551 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016).
403
See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 169 (June 31, 2005).
401
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seized by the Nazis, need to be restored to their rightful owners out
of respect for the bonds of family, integral to personal identity.404
The utilitarian case for property protections has been made, in
short, by everyone from Aristotle to Garrett Hardin (whose “tragedy
of the commons” is often seen as a justification for private property
rights).405 Some of these strategic arguments extend to the international protection of the right and some are more convincing than
others. For authors like Hernando de Soto, granting discrete land
titles to individuals, including those who formerly held land in common, is absolutely essential for economic development.406 Others,
like the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De
Shutter, or, as noted, certain feminist defenders of CEDAW,
strongly dispute the wisdom of such efforts and argue that there are
better ways to ensure security of tenure to poor farmers, including
recognition of communal land ownership.407
Today, as the hostility to “free trade pacts” in the United States
demonstrates, there is considerable skepticism about the instrumentalist arguments that are sometimes made to defend global rights to
property, particularly as applied to foreign traders and investors.
Contentions that such rights are part and parcel of “economic freedom” (including free trade and capital flows and the spread of IIAs)
and that market freedoms are the only, or best, way to promote prosperity and development no longer satisfy. Many resist the continuation of the NAFTA or the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partner-

404
The famous Klimt saga, the subject of a Hollywood film (“Woman in
Gold”), had a happy ending. But the Nazi looting of art was, of course, far more
widespread and its full scope and consequences for the rightful owners of these
works may never be fully known or addressed. See, e.g., LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE
RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE
NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 3 (1998);
Will Gompertz, Nazi Trove in Munich Contains Unknown Works by Masters,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24818541;
Nazi Loot Probe: More Art Found at Gurlitt Austria Home, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26133532.
405
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45
(1968). See also WALDRON, supra note 58, at 5.
406
DE SOTO, supra note 361, at 49–51.
407
See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 11, at 271; see also General Recommendation on Article 16, supra note 336, ¶¶ 36–38.
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ship, not because these pacts defend the right to property, but because they lack confidence in the real benefits produced by adherence to David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, they do
not believe these treaties promote the desired trade or capital flows,
or they believe that global trade and capital do not lift all boats but
principally enrich those with yachts.408 Reasonable people disagree
about the overall economic benefits of these treaties. Those who defend the right to property only through instrumental arguments
premised on the merits of free trade and capital flows are not likely
to convince those who are skeptical, rightly or wrongly, about the
wisdom of those flows.409
Somewhat more plausible are utilitarian arguments that states
that fail to respect the property rights that they have previously
granted tend to be weak rule of law states, generally with less than
independent judiciaries that cannot be counted on to enforce other
human rights.410 On this view, the human right of property is a
needed strut to support the rule of law more generally. Those who
make this argument point out that authoritarian rulers—from
Chavez to Putin to Xi—have used property deprivations to penalize
political opponents like Mr. Mezerhane.411
408

Compare JAMES GWARTNEY, ROBERT LAWSON & JOSHUA HALL,
ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2015 ANNUAL REPORT v–vii (2015),
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-theworld-2015.pdf, with THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2d ed. 2008) (arguing, inter
alia, that global inequality has become worse despite the turn to the free market
solutions). See also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
572–73 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014).
409
See, generally, POGGE , supra note 408.
410
See, e.g., Daniel Behn, Tarald Laudal Berge & Malcolm Langford, Poor
States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration 15–17 (June 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978546 (demonstrating a significant
correlation between respondent states that lose investor-state disputes and those
states’ capacity to protect property rights); David Gomtsyan & Suren Gomtysan,
What Do the Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Tell about Property Rights across Europe? 2 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-009, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2762522 (suggesting that
the ECtHR is more likely to find property violations in countries, such as those in
the new democracies of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, due to weaker
rule of property law protections in those countries).
411
See, e.g., Gans-Morse, supra note 6, at 264.
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The connections between respect for property rights at the national and international levels and the general health of a country’s
devotion to the rule of law are particularly salient when the national
rule of law completely breaks down. When the rule of law clearly
collapses, it is more likely that a country will face the kinds of property deprivations with “special gravity” that the IACtHR has faced.
As U.S. court cases addressing “genocidal takings” remind us, property rights abuses, including outright thefts of property, have long
accompanied the systematic mass atrocities too often seen throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Property rights violations have served as a tool to pursue ethnic cleansing or to commit
other crimes against humanity, or genocide, as in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2012; they can be used, as in perhaps Venezuela
today, to enable “malnutrition by expropriation.”412 The Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia targeted intellectuals-cum-property owners;
Mao denied landed peasants access to their plots during his “Great
Leap Forward.”413 It is also true that resort to property deprivations—the routine destruction of titles, for example, during such
mass atrocities—have complicated efforts to restore the rule of law
or engage in transitional justice.414 Nor have governments bent on
forms of ethnic cleansing stopped using property deprivations as a
tool today. Legislation enacted in 1991 in Kosovo had the object and
effect of restricting the sale of properties from Kosovo Serbs to Kosovo Albanians as a means of ensuring that the Serb population did

412

Howard-Hassman, supra note 55, at 183–86, 193–94.
See Phnom Penh, Cambodia Land Rights in Focus, IRIN (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97654/analysis-cambodian-land-rights-focus;
Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., The Horrors of Communist China Under Mao Zedong
That Most Westerners Don’t Know About, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 1, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/horrors-of-communist-china-under-mao-20175.
414
Thus, recent press reports narrate problems associated with the Khmer
Rouge’s decision to destroy all property rights records in the 1970s. See Pauline
Chiou, Khmer Rouge Legacy: Land Disputes, CNN (Nov. 27, 2011, 11:54 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/25/world/asia/cambodia-property-developmentcontroversy/index.html; see also Penh, supra note 412 (noting that “[l]and rights
remains a highly controversial issue in Cambodia, where the communist Khmer
Rouge banned private property in the late 1970s in their effort to establish an
agrarian society, destroying scores of land documents in the process”).
413
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not decline.415 The pending ICC arrest warrant against al Bashir of
Sudan includes a charge that forces under his control “systematically committed acts of pillaging” towns and villages.416
But, not everyone is convinced that situations of rule of law collapse tell us much about the everyday connection between respect
for the rule of law and property rights—or that even if such a connection exists, property rights need international protection via
treaty. Even in the situations noted above, the causal arrows are not
clear. It is doubtful that if property rights had been more secure or
protected via treaty, any or some of these mass atrocities would not
have occurred. Not everyone believes that a government willing to
sacrifice the rights of foreign investors for the public good will next
violate the rights of its own citizens, or that IIAs and human rights
treaties with property protections are required to (or can) prevent
either or both outcomes.
Instrumental justifications aside, what can be said about whether
an international human right of property advances the most common
justification offered for human rights: protecting human dignity? 417
Human dignity played a large role in Louis Henkin’s path-breaking defense of human rights. Henkin was a revolutionary advocate
that our age was the “age of rights,” in which every individual “has
legitimate claims upon his or her own society,” justified not because
these rights are necessary to achieve some common good or because
they are granted to us by the grace of democratic governments, but
415

See, e.g., Margaret Cordial & Knut Rosandhaug, The Response of the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to Address Property
Rights Challenges, in HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN POST-CONFLICT
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PEACE OPERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY AND
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 61, 65–67 (Scott Leckie ed., 2008).
416
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, at 4–5 (Mar. 4, 2009),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.pdf.
417
Dignity is the most commonly relied upon justification for human rights,
among both scholars and courts. See generally, Christopher McCrudden, Human
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 655
(2008); Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law,
in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LIBER AMICORUM SPIROS SIMITIS 249,
249–51 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000); Oscar Schachter, Comment,
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 853 (1983); Jürgen Habermas, The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human
Rights, 41 METAPHILOSOPHY 464, 464 (2010).
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because they are moral entitlements owed to all human beings.418
He argued that dignity plays a foundational role in the very idea of
calling some rules “human rights” and according them exceptional
importance.419 He suggested that dignitarian entitlements are called
“rights” to indicate that they are claims “as of right,” that is, not
provided “by appeal to grace, or charity, or brotherhood, or love,”
and not because they are “earned or deserved,” but because they are
claims “upon society,” “derive[d] from moral principles governing
relations between persons” that society has the burden to satisfy.420
The dignitarian intuitions that underlie the human rights instruments in the Appendix are not hard to discern. A number of these
texts—such as the Refugee Convention, the treaty on indigenous
peoples, and for stateless persons—explicitly recognize that the
right of property is not dependent on sovereigns to give or withhold.
Each of these recognizes that, as both Thomas Jefferson and Henkin
said, certain property rights, “inherent” to personhood, are not dependent on a person’s nationality or lack of one.421 Under these treaties, states should not discriminate between refugees who are not
part of their national social contract because they are people; they
need to do the same with respect to stateless persons even if these
human beings lack a state protector; they need to recognize the right
to land of indigenous peoples even when a state has not formally
given such persons or groups formal title. Such treaties usefully remind us that foreigners are people too and that governments do not
always get to decide unilaterally who a person with rights is. Equality instruments, such as CEDAW and CERD, might be seen as associating, at a fundamental level, equal treatment with dignity.422

418

Henkin, supra note 324, at 11. See also HENKIN, supra note 57, at 2. Henkin’s conception of dignity appears to owe much to Kant’s well-known concept
of human dignity as embracing the categorical imperative. See IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24–25 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1998) (1785); see generally Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s Concept of Dignity and
Modern Political Thought, 8 HIST. OF EUR. IDEAS 319, 319 (1987).
419
Henkin, supra note 324, at 11.
420
HENKIN, supra note 57, at 3.
421
See id.; see also Henkin, supra note 324, at 15; Va. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, supra note 87.
422
For examples of this connection made by national courts, see, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 378, at 271.
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But, as often been noted, dignity itself is a contested concept
with a plurality of meanings that is left undefined by all the human
rights instruments that nonetheless rely on it, particularly in their
preambles.423 Further, neither Henkin nor others of the founding human rights generation clarified what they meant when they said that
dignity was “the foundational value” for human rights. 424 Since the
time that Henkin’s Age of Rights was published, however, there has
been renewed attention to the philosophical study of the idea of human dignity.425 More recently, Jeremy Waldron has usefully provided four possible ways to understand the idea that dignity is a
foundational concept for human rights. According to Waldron this
might mean: (1) “that, as a matter of history and genealogy,” human
rights was generated from conceptions of human dignity; (2) “that
[human dignity] is the source of [human rights], in the way that the
application of one legal proposition may be the source of the validity
of another;” (3) that [human rights] can be derived logically from
[human dignity], either deductively or with the help of empirical
premises;” or (4) that [human dignity] throws some indispensable
light on [human rights] or helps in the interpretation of [them].”426
Waldron skeptically examines each of these conceptions and
suggests that perhaps it is best to see dignity as a “status” concept
“that comprises a given set of rights.”427 He suggests that we do not
have human rights because we have human dignity, but that human
dignity is what we enjoy when one’s human rights are respected.428
Waldron also argues that contemporary international human rights
instruments constitute an effort to elevate the rank or status of all
423
See Jeremy J. Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, 6–9
(N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers No. 374, 2013). Waldron also
suggests that the absence of a definition for dignity makes it a questionable candidate on which to build a foundation for human rights. He notes George Kateb’s
point that to the extent human rights are “nonsense on stilts,” the idea of human
dignity only adds more nonsense. Id. at 9. See also McCrudden, supra note 417,
at 702.
424
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991), 48 EUR. J. SOC. 201, 205–07 (2007) [hereinafter Waldron, Dignity and Rank].
425
See, e.g., id. at 201; McCrudden, supra note 417, at 657–58; MICHAEL
ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 4–5 (2012).
426
Waldron, supra note 423, at 12.
427
Id. at 25.
428
Id.
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persons to the level once given only to the rank of nobility; that is,
that the human species is now owed rights once granted only to
members of the nobility.429 Waldron acknowledges that the notion
of dignity as a foundational idea may make sense to the extent that
it provides a common rationale to explain how the various rights and
duties in the international human rights canon hang together.430 He
argues that dignitarian ideas may supply an underlying coherence to
these rights as a whole.431
The human right to the protection of property, including the protection of at least some forms of private as well as communal property, can be plausibly examined using any of Waldron’s useful delineations of what dignity means or what it means to use it as a
“foundational” concept. Following Waldron, the right to property is
demonstrably a “status” concept whose precise contents are defined,
as many human rights instruments in the Appendix suggest, based
on the characteristics of the persons to whom the right is accorded.
Despite these treaties’ emphasis on equality, states have distinguished among the property protection rights to be accorded based
on distinct categories of persons depending on their status.432 Children, prisoners, stateless persons, and refugees, for example, do not
receive the same treatment with respect to their property protections
as do a state’s adult citizens and, to some extent, some international
regimes (e.g., the NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, IIAs generally,
and possibly the ECHR) continue to evince the solicitude for the
property rights of foreigners that characterized the law of state responsibility long before the rise of human rights.433 One needs to be
cautious though about concluding that the instruments in the Appendix, taken as a whole, are an effort to elevate, in bits and pieces, the
429

Waldron, Dignity and Rank, supra note 424, at 201.
Waldron, supra note 423, at 10–11.
431
Id. at 26, 28–29.
432
See e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 17,
2005).
433
See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property and Human Rights, in
THE TAKING OF PROPERTY BY THE STATE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 355, 355–75 (1982); see also James v. United Kingdom, 98
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 68 (1986) (dicta suggesting that greater solicitude for the
property rights of aliens is based on the fact that these persons do not have equal
access to political processes for making laws in their host states).
430
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status of all persons to enjoy the level of property protections once
reserved for foreigners’ property. The idea that today even a country’s nationals are entitled to the extensive property protections now
provided in IIAs ignores the differences among the property instruments in the Appendix and presumes that a single level of property
protection is required for all. Caution about such a simple conclusion is also warranted because, as noted, IIAs—and the protections
they extend to foreigners as well as the limitations imposed on
states’ right to regulate—are a moving target.
The dignitarian foundations for the human right to property protection can also be plausibly explained using Waldron’s four possible delineations of what this might mean noted above. These are
considered in turn.
Waldron is skeptical of his first, genealogical, frame. He argues
that it is historically inaccurate to contend that human rights grew
out of pre-existing discourses relating to human dignity and that it
is probably more accurate to say the reverse, namely that the idea of
dignity reflects socio-historical conceptions of basic rights and freedoms that preceded it.434 But while this may be true for human rights
as whole, a historical/genealogical view of the relationship between
specific international rights of property and the foundational value
of dignity is not implausible. As the chronology of human rights instruments indicates, while the right to property protection was included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a vague and
possibly rhetorical value, that right was not given concrete form until years later, in the course of repeated invocations by regional human rights courts (particularly the ECtHR and IACtHR)435 and as
property protections came to be included in a number of legally
binding instruments for different groups of persons.
The various human rights treaties recognizing the right of property and to non-discriminatory treatment with respect to it are modern post-U.N. products—as is the evolving institutional jurispru-

434

Waldron, supra note 423, at 13–14.
See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparation and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 142–45 (Aug.
31, 2001); Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 223, ¶ 82 (Mar. 4, 2011); Marckx v. Belgium, 31
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dence giving these rights ever more nuanced content. As is suggested by the IACtHR case law noted above, as well as the ongoing
dynamic re-interpretations of what the right of or to property means
in the course of general comments and views issued by U.N. human
committees and U.N. special rapporteurs, what that right means today to women, indigenous peoples, children, prisoners, the disabled,
or immigrants is not the same as it was in 1948.436
Today, as Henkin would predict, the contours of property protections are often derived from certain dignitarian “moral intuitions.”437 The contemporary human right of property owes much to
contested and evolving (but often strongly held) ideas of what human dignity means in the modern world. For example, the proposition that married women and widows are owed secure property
rights (including to the marital home) and that national laws that fail
to respect these rights are illegal is, to a considerable extent, derived
from progressive notions of what it means to see women as fully
human.438 Notably, these legal propositions may be read into instruments (such as the ICCPR) whose texts do not contain such guarantees.439 While human dignity as a general universal value may have
been originally inspired by instruments like the U.N. Charter itself
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, those instruments did not close off dignity’s juris-generative ripples. It is not
implausible to argue that institutional actors such as judges on the
IACtHR now charged with defining the scope of the right of property derive new ideas of what the static text on property before them
means based on intuitive ideas about what “human dignity” requires
in contemporary society. Determining the genealogical roots of the
contemporary human right of property is a complex project and presents a moving target. The target is moving not least because to the
extent the goal is to elevate the status of all persons to the level of
property protections owed to aliens, the goalposts of that treatment—set by IIAs—is changing rapidly, as states re-calibrate the
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See, e.g., Ikdahl, supra note 369, at 289; Goonesekere, supra note 368, at
396–97.
437
Henkin, supra note 324, at 10, 15.
438
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 41–43 (2006).
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ICCPR, supra note 21, arts. 1, 2.
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balance between their rights to regulate versus the property protections they are willing to guarantee foreign investors.440
Nor is Waldron’s second conception of the function of dignity—
dignity as the source of validity or legitimacy for human rights—
inapposite. While states are bound by the treaties identified in the
Appendix because they are treaties—as a matter of positive law—
the extent to which states continue to violate these pacts and attempt
on occasion to withdraw from them remains a source of great concern. Human rights advocates, including those fighting property
rights violations, continue to turn to human dignity as grundnorm to
push for enforcement or implementation and to deter states from (as
some have) withdrawing from regional human rights systems or otherwise undermining rights protections.441 Appeals to dignity as a
source of legitimacy and a deeper source of validity442 than mere
pacta sunt servanda are particularly important for rights in the international rights canon—such as property protections—which are
otherwise fragile under positive law because of the ambivalence in
which they are held or the fact that few claim they enjoy the status
of jus cogens.443 The age of Brexit, Trump, Xi, and Putin may not
be a promising time to rely simply on positive law and pacta sunt
servanda as a basis for encouraging respect for human rights, including the right to property protection. It may be, on the contrary,
just the right moment for dignitarian appeals precisely to stress the
“universality, inalienability, and non-forfeitability” of these
rights—and the need to be consistent about ensuring the dignity of
all persons.444 Indeed, appeals to such higher values may be all the
440

Thus, many of the changes being made to contemporary BITs and FTAs—
from the reformulation of FET guarantees to “clarifications” of the distinction
between legitimate regulation and improper expropriations—are designed to protect the rights of states to regulate while still protecting the property of foreign
investors. See generally Alvarez, Our Investment Treaties, supra note 53, at 143–
44.
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See Waldron, supra note 423, at 14.
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Id. at 14–16.
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Higgins, supra note 433, at 355.
444
Waldron, supra note 423, at 15; see also WALDRON, supra note 58, at 414–
18 (arguing that defenses of property rights based on their contributions to the
“freedom, autonomy, and the development of independence and responsibility”
of individuals encourage consistent advocacy of such values on behalf of all, even
the most property-less).
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more necessary to mobilize civil disobedience to induce state compliance with these treaties or to preclude withdrawal from needed
institutions like the IACtHR or the ECtHR.
Waldron’s third frame is supported by the rulings of international courts such as that of the IACtHR surveyed in Part III. That
court’s decisions, along with the views presented by others charged
with the day to day application of the human right of property,
whether legally binding or not, provide numerous examples of how
adjudicative or other interpretative findings with respect to these
treaty rights are derived logically from ideas of human dignity, either deductively or with the help of empirical premises.445 A wealth
of G.A. resolutions and World Bank reports that emphasize the extent to which respect for women’s property rights advances not only
the economic health of nations but the capacity of women for selfrealization provide examples of the latter.446 The CEDAW committee’s ongoing interpretations of what it means for women to enjoy
“equal” rights to marital property, often derived from ideas that
women need to be able to have normative agency—to be able to
maintain a home, to secure equal pay in their jobs, to inherit marital
property, or to establish a business—provide evidence of the former.447 While, as Waldron indicates, the idea that normative agency
is important to human dignity and that it is really at stake in particular factual contexts are contested notions, these are the “moral intuitions” that, as Henkin would predict, appear to make a difference
to those engaged in human rights advocacy and interpretation.448
Moreover, adjudicators or U.N. human rights bureaucrats who
rely on dignitarian ideas to justify conclusions about whether the
right of property can be invoked in particular contexts are in good
company. They may be presuming, along with Amartya Sen, that
the right to property allows people to lead the kind of lives people

445
See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31,
2001); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 147–49 (June 17, 2005).
446
See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 373.
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See General Recommendation on Article 16, supra note 336, art. 16 ¶¶ 30–
39.
448
Waldron, supra note 423, at 17–18; Henkin, supra note 324, at 10, 15.
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value.449 They may be following Hegel in the belief that personal
property enables the exercise of dignity in the form of individual
autonomy; they may be assuming that property enables persons to
express their personality, achieve their independence, and master a
degree of self-government.450 They may be suggesting, as did Aristotle, that without nondiscriminatory access to basic core rights to
property, including security to their homes, people are slaves.451
More controversially, some applications of the human right of
property seem premised on intuitive connections between the dignity of labor and the dignity of self. This connection is suggested by
some IACtHR rulings in Part III,452 national laws (as in Germany)453
which draw a close connection between the right to labor and the
right to property, and some of the other international instruments in
the Appendix (including non-human rights instruments that protect
industrial property, investors, the wages of workers, or the right to
farm or use personal or communal lands).454 A number of the property rights instruments in the Appendix appear to presume a connection between the right to work and the right to benefit from that
work.
The presumptive labor/property tie, most closely associated with
Locke,455 has been the subject of considerable scorn, particularly by
legal philosophers. Prominent legal philosophers argue that, as a
449

See Monteagudo, supra note 58, at 8 (connecting the right to property to
Amartya Sen’s views).
450
See id. (connecting the right to property to Hegel); WALDRON, supra note
58, at 343–89 (discussing Hegel’s justifications for private property).
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See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 132, at 18.
452
See Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 223, ¶ 83 (Mar. 4, 2011).
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HENKIN ET AL., supra note 364, at 1538.
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See infra Appendix.
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As famously recognized in Locke’s words from his First Treatise on Government:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person . . . . The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes
out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of
other Men.
LOCKE, supra note 69, at 305–06.
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matter of strict logic, Locke’s idea that one can “mix” one’s labor
with an object and therefore acquire a right to the object makes no
sense.456 Locke’s defense of personal property has also been discredited to the extent that he used it to justify European rights to take
property from the American Indians as far as the latter had not, in
his view, “improved” the land;457 and Locke’s views have been resisted by many others, including, of course, by Karl Marx.458 Nonetheless, the texts of a number of property rights international instruments as well as national laws suggest that the labor/property connection may be another one of those “moral intuitions” which the
drafters of these laws could not resist—and which those interpreting
them ignore at their peril. International law, including treaties ratified by nearly all states in the Appendix, presumes that the right to
one’s labor presupposes the right to own the product of that labor.
As a chief critic of Locke, Jeremy Waldron, points out, drawing a
connection between acts of appropriation and the right to property
need not be grounded in Locke’s proposition that property entitlements emerge when objects are “mixed with one’s labor”; such
property entitlements might be, more plausibly, argued on the premise that persons should be entitled to property that they have “improved” as an additional way to evince respect for Hegelian ideas of
individual autonomy and responsibility.459 It would therefore be
wrong to presume that some, or all of property rights instruments in
the Appendix, subscribe to Locke’s vision of property, as opposed
to, for example, Rousseau’s or Hegel’s.460 And, these instruments
456
See, e.g., Liam B. Murphy, Professor of Law, N.Y.U., Private Law and
Public Illusion, CLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE: “THE FORMATION OF NORMATIVE
ORDERS” (May 2–3, 2016), http://www.normativeorders.net/en/events/frankfurtlectures/48-veranstaltungen/frankfurt-lectures/4662-private-law-and-public-illusion-eng; WALDRON, supra note 58, at 184–91.
457
See e.g., Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 531–32 (2006).
458
See Richard Teichgraeber III, Rousseau’s Argument for Property, 2 HIST.
EUR. IDEAS 115, 127–28 (1981).
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WALDRON, supra note 58, at 310–13 (connecting this approach to Hegel’s
account of the ethical importance of property).
460
Locke’s most prominent antagonist with respect to property, Rousseau, argued for Republican controls over the excesses wrought by acquisition of property
and the desire for profit, not for the elimination of private property. Teichgraeber,
supra note 458, at 121–124. Indeed, as Teichgraeber points out, Rousseau teaches
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certainly do not follow Locke insofar as he refused to extend the
benefits of either labor or property rights to indigenous peoples.461
For much the same reasons, ideas of dignity seem to be used in
the fourth sense defined by Waldron: to throw “indispensable light”
on what a human right means or to help in the interpretation of it.462
They appear to underlie decisions issued by the IACtHR (such as
those directed at the forfeiting of property to the state in criminal
cases noted at Section III(B)(2)(b)), and are inescapable in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.463 They may also help to explain the IACtHR’s greater solicitude to some victims of property deprivations
who happen to be poor.464
CONCLUSION
This Article is modeled in many respects on those included in
Henkin’s Age of Rights. It canvasses weighty arguments directed
against the idea of the human right to property that emulate Henkin’s
“bill of particulars” against the idea of human rights generally. 465 It
the child Emile to cultivate beans in order to show the child, by example, that
what one cultivates, that is, “given his time, his labour, and his trouble, [and] his
very self to” provides a claim “against all the world[.]” Id. at 126 (quoting JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ÉMILE 62 (Barbara Foxley trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
1911) (1762)); see also David S. Siroky & Hans-Jörg Sigwart, Principle and Prudence: Rousseau on Private Property and Inequality, 46 POLITY 381, 381 (2014).
461
See e.g., Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A
New Approach to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 DUKE L.J. 1061, 1065 (2005)
(“John Locke articulated the quintessential European position on the rights of indigenous peoples: that they had no rights to lands they did not cultivate.”) (footnote omitted).
462
Waldron, supra note 423, at 12.
463
See, e.g., McCrudden, supra note 417, at 683; see also Paolo G. Carozza,
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 931, 934–39 (2008) (agreeing with McCrudden insofar as concluding
that the ECtHR relies on three core dignitarian ideas: (1) an ontological claim
about the intrinsic worth of the human person; (2) a relational claim about how
others should treat human persons in view of their inherent value; and (3) a claim
regarding the proper role of the state vis-á-vis the individual (i.e., that the state
exists for the good of persons and not vice-versa)).
464
See, e.g., Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 164
(Oct. 25, 2012).
465
Indeed, Henkin’s general “bill of particulars” strikingly echoes contemporary objections to the specific right to property protection:
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then attempts to do for the human right of property what Henkin did
for human rights as whole: canvass how the right is compatible with
U.S. values, identify what it means in particular cases (as in the IACtHR), and advance normative justifications for its existence.
This Article does not address one question with which contemporary scholars of international property rights like Sprankling are
much concerned. It does not consider whether, apart from the instruments enumerated in the Appendix, a universally applicable human
right to property protection exists as a matter of customary international law or general principles of law. This question, which lurks
even in the context of some of the U.S. expropriation rulings discussed above,466 has been the subject of considerable attention.
Scholars dealing with the rules applicable to the protection of alien
investors have repeatedly revisited this question, at least since Elihu
Root affirmed, before the American Society of International Law in
1910, that an “international minimum standard of treatment” exists
to protect the property of U.S. investors abroad or later, in the wake
of Cordell Hull’s statements to Mexican officials in 1938 that customary international law requires “prompt, adequate and effective
[T]he rights idea is selfish and promotes egoism. It is atomistic, disharmonious,
confrontational, often litigious . . . . It is antisocial, permitting and encouraging
the individual to set up selfish interests as he or she sees them against the common
interest commonly determined. The idea of rights challenges democracy, negating
popular sovereignty and frustrating the will of the majority. In principle as well
as in detail, it may exalt individual autonomy over communality, egoism over
gemeinschaft, freedom over order, adversariness over harmony . . . . It imposes an
artificial and narrow view of the public good . . . and takes critical decisions from
those chosen to govern and the only ones capable of governing. In many societies
and circumstances, the idea of rights helps immunize egotistic property interests
and extravagant claims to autonomy and liberty, thereby entrenching reaction and
preventing revolutionary social change.
HENKIN, supra note 57, at 182.
466
Thus, in its 2012 Abelesz decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that there is
no need to search for a self-executing treaty so long as the underlying rules were
part of customary international law. It therefore turned to customary international
law to find the “genocidal taking” exception to the domestic takings rule. “Conventions that not all nations ratify can still be evidence of customary international
law. As we explained above, the expropriations alleged by plaintiffs were an integral part of the planned genocide of the Hungarian Holocaust. And genocide has
been recognized as a violation of customary international law.” Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), aff’d
sub nom. Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
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compensation” when expropriating the assets of foreigners.467 Those
who initiated the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program
have since indicated that reaffirming these rules was a key reason
for pursuing BITs.468 The extent to which customary law protects
the rights of foreign investors, ably scrutinized by scholars, international and national judges, investor-state arbitrators, and many others, requires no revisiting here.469
In Mezerhane, discussed at the beginning of this essay, the U.S.
district court had on hand (but ignored) expert witness Joseph
Weiler’s opinion that the uncompensated expropriation of property
violates two distinct branches of customary international law,
namely the rules governing state responsibility for the protection of
aliens and its rules against violating fundamental human rights.470
Weiler argued that universally applicable property protections also
exist under general principles of law recognized by the national laws
of nations.471 Others, including John Sprankling, have advanced
comparable claims, albeit with more nuance.472
The case for a universal right to property protection as a matter
of customary international law is largely based on the fact that, as
noted, more than two-thirds of nations are now parties to a regional
human rights treaty—namely the American Convention, the ECHR,
the African Charter, or the Arab Charter—that include the right to
property and a court with the power to issue legally binding judgments to enforce it. It would also draw support from the fact that
only two states in the world, Palau and South Sudan, are not parties

467
See Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4
AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 521–23 (1910); The Hull Formula (Exchanges between Cordell Hull and the Mexican Government (1938), in AMERICAN CLASSICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 24, at 235.
468
See e.g., Alvarez, supra note 342, at 20.
469
For a survey of views and precedents, see generally Alvarez, International
Investment Law, supra note 24, at 1–81.
470
Weiler Report, supra note 299.
471
Id. at 8. But cf. Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785
F.3d 545, 552 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). The Mezerhane Court, which ultimately dismissed Mezerhane’s claim on the basis of
sovereign immunity, focused on whether the American Convention of Human
Rights was self-executing and did not address the broader questions of customary
international law or general principles. Id. at 548–49.
472
Sprankling, supra note 13, at 464–66.
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to at least one treaty in the Appendix, such as those barring discriminatory treatment with respect to property rights against vulnerable
groups, such as CEDAW (189 parties), CERD (179), the Migrant
Workers convention (51), and the Disabilities convention (175).473
But, while it is not unusual today to use widespread treaty ratifications as proof that a rule of universal custom exists, as Sprankling
acknowledges those who would insist on separate indications of
opinio juris to make a definite finding that custom exists would not
find evidence that states have entered into treaties necessarily sufficient.474 The contention that a human right to property protection
exists as a general principle of law would draw some support from
the fact that today, when some ninety-five percent of the world’s
nearly two hundred states guarantee the right to property under their
national laws (most commonly in their national constitutions), there
is no longer an East-West divide with respect to national laws that
troubled Henkin when he was the chief rapporteur for the 1986 U.S.
Restatement of Foreign Relations.475
But neither conclusion, even if correct, would support anything
other than a primitive or rudimentary conception of what the ostensible universal right of property would entail. A universal right
grounded in either custom or general principles presumably would
not go further than the wording in the original Universal Declaration
473

See infra, Appendix. Sprankling also canvasses other evidence for this conclusion, including G.A. Resolutions and a 1993 U.N. report authored by Venezuelan scholar Luis Valencia Rodriguez that cast doubt on the conclusion that the
right to property was truly universal. Sprankling, supra note 13 at 472–73.
474
Id. at 495–97. But short-circuiting the need to search for sufficient state
practice and opinio juris by relying on widespread treaty ratification for findings
of custom is, at least in the practice of national and international courts, quite
common. See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How
Do Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD 117, 132–34 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (citing an empirical survey of
how national and international courts find contemporary rules of custom for the
conclusion that resort to widespread treaty ratifications is the leading source of
evidence for adjudicative findings of custom).
475
See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 485, 492–93. But arguments premised on
alleged general principles of law often paint with a broad brush and may ignore
very real differences in how national laws and constitutions define and protect
property rights. See generally Neha Jain, Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 111, 111–13
(2016) (critiquing how international criminal courts have deployed alleged general principles of law).
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of Human Rights, which leaves the parameters of such a property
right, along with the definition of property owed protection, undefined and presumptively subject to considerable state discretion.476
Even if a universally applicable human right to property exists, that
right would need to be capacious enough to embrace a wide range
of state laws and economic systems with widely different emphases
on reliance on the market—and more importantly, differing conceptions of how property rights relate to equality and human dignity. It
would also need to be malleable enough to survive the fact that despite widespread treaty reservations, some states remain outside
many of the property protecting instruments in the Appendix, while
a few have taken reservations expressly with respect to their property provisions.477
What can be said with more certainty is this: human rights of
property exist even if they are grounded in treaties and not universal
custom or general principles. International law has therefore recognized such a right, including, but not limited to, the right to compensation for government takings, and appears to base the right of property on universal values like human dignity, even if the international
community of states has not yet extended it to all humans as a matter
of universal customary law. The vast majority of states that are parties to treaties like the regional human rights treaties or U.N. “human
rights” conventions in the Appendix have elevated property rights

476
“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, supra note 17, art. 17. For one attempt to give content to such a minimalist
conception, see Henry G. Schermers, The International Protection of the Right of
Property, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 565, 565
(Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1990).
477
Thus, the United States does not consider itself to be a party to any regional
human rights system for human rights, notwithstanding its ratification of the OAS
Charter, which has been interpreted as incorporating the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. On the evolution of the American Declaration
within the OAS, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID P.
STEWART, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, 226–33 (3rd ed.
2002). Switzerland decided not to ratify Protocol 1 of the European Convention
of Human Rights, in part because it includes Article 1’s property right. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 1, 2013, INTERPELLATION ZUR
RATIFIZIERUNG DES 1. ZUSATZPROTOKOLLS DER EMRK (Switz.).
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to a fundamental right, even while not defining what protected property is.478 These states have answered Lauterpacht’s original suspicions about the wisdom of recognizing such a right at the international level in the way states like the United States have done so
under national law for two centuries: by recognizing that property
rights can be “fundamental” even if they can still be trumped by
other social values, including the right of others and the right/duties
of states to regulate for the public good.479 In regional human rights
regimes and under IIAs, states have delegated to adjudicators the
power to define the property rights requiring protections as well as
the corresponding duties and rights of states with respect to them.
On occasion, these adjudicators have not been satisfied with ensuring that governments accord the mere opportunity to enjoy property
but have insisted that people actually have them.480 In human rights
treaties they have extended property protections to an individual or
a group—and treated them as “human rights”—even though to
greater extent than other rights, rights to property (particularly but
not only rights to private property) curtail the freedoms of others (as
through the right to exclude).
When and how international law recognizes the human right of
property (including determinations about what it applies to or its relative status as compared to other human rights), on how states can
regulate the right, and the nature of the “bundle of rights” conveyed,
are complex matters that, at present, are left to bilateral, regional,
and some multilateral treaty regimes to determine, with no assurance
that the determinations made or interpretations advanced under one
treaty regime will be the same as in another. Efforts to provide a
uniform set of responses to these matters through a global international law of property are likely to fail and are probably counterproductive. Only the fragmented, evolving, and possibly contradictory

478

See Sprankling, supra note 13, at 481.
See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 3–4. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (confirming the power under eminent domain
for a local government to take property from one private owner and transfer it to
another for purposes of economic development).
480
See generally WALDRON, supra note 58, at 390 (arguing that the normative
reasons for property rights are not satisfied with a state’s providing the mere opportunity to satisfy them).
479
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treaties that we have hold the prospect of answering the grave concerns the international right of property elicits, including perceptions that they threaten sovereignty.
The least controversial normative justification for the international right of property (including the right to private property) may
well be that it is essential to the advancement of human dignity, that
is, the full development of “freedom, autonomy and the development of independence and responsibility” of individuals.481 And the
best response to the problem that the international right of property
promotes (or may even be responsible for) global poverty and inequality may be the answer that Waldron provides in justification of
general rights-based arguments in favor of national protections of
private property: when persons defend property rights on the basis
that they advance everyone’s dignitary needs, they are also recognizing that no one should be denied “the amount of property and
economic security” they need to satisfy at least their basic needs if
not more.482 Paradoxically, the national and international property
rights that some see as gravely complicit in massive inequalities
both within societies and among states may be vital to future efforts
to rectify these inequalities.

481
482

Id. at 416.
Id. at 414.
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APPENDIX
Significant Instruments Recognizing the Right to Property in
International Law
References:
*: The United States is a party to this treaty.
**: The United States voted in favor of this declaration.
***: This declaration is now incorporated into the OAS Charter and
according to the OAS, the United States is therefore a party to it (and
subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission (but not
Court) of Human Rights).
****: The United States signed this treaty but has not ratified it.
Note: These instruments and others not listed may also include protections for interests that many see as equivalent to “property” such
as rights to food or housing in the ICESCR (Art. 11(1)) or the “moral
and material interests” arising from “scientific, literary or artistic production” protected under the ICESCR (Art. 15(1)(c)) or the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 27(2)).

#

1

Instrument
Year
1883483

Name
Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial
Property (revised in 1900,
1911, 1925, 1934, 1958,
1967, & 1979), article 1484

Defined Right
State Parties
177*485
(1967 Stockholm Act)

 Right to industrial property.486

483
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
484
Id. art. 1.
485
WIPO-Administered Treaties: Paris Convention (Total Contracting Parties: 177), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
486
Paris Convention, supra note 483, art. 1.
487
Id. art. 3.

Beneficiaries
 Nationals of member
states and nationals of others domiciled or established in the member
states (art. 3).487
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1886488

Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works* (revised in
1896, 1908, 1914, 1928,
1948, 1967, 1971, 1979)489

175490
(1971 Paris
Act)

1891493

Madrid Arrangement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks
(revised in 1900, 1911,
1925, 1934, 1957, 1967, &
1979), article 1(2)494

55495
(1967 Stockholm Act)

488

691

 Protection of literary and artistic
works, e.g., exclusive right to translate, make reproductions, to broadcast, to perform in public dramatic and
musical works, to make motion pictures, adaptations and arrangements of
the work.491

 Right to protection for marks.496

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July
24, 1971 and amended in 1979).
489
Id.
490
WIPO-Administered Treaties: Berne Convention (Total Contracting Parties: 175), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited on Feb. 28, 2018).
491
Berne Convention, supra note 488, arts. 8–12.
492
Id. art. 2.
493
Madrid Arrangement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
494
Id. art. 1(2).
495
WIPO-Administered Treaties: Madrid Agreement (Marks) (Total Contracting Parties: 55), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=21 (last visited on Feb. 28, 2018).
496
Madrid Agreement, supra note 493, art. 1.
497
Id.

 Authors of literary and
artistic works.492

 Nationals of member
states and nationals of others domiciled or established in the member states.497
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4

1907498

5

509

1948
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Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on
Land499

Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, article
17.510

38500

**

511
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 Right of prisoners of war to property over personal belongings.501
 Prohibition to destroy or seize
enemy property.502
 Prohibition of confiscation of
enemy property during capitulations.503
 Right to private property of municipalities, and institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the
arts and sciences.504
 Right to own property.512
 Right not to be deprived of property arbitrarily.513

498
Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
499
Id.
500
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=
XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=195 (last visited Feb. 28,
2018).
501
Hague Convention, supra note 498, annex, art. 4.
502
Id. arts. 22–23,
503
Id.
504
Id. art. 56.
505
Id. art. 4.
506
Id. art. 23.
507
Id. art. 35.
508
Id. art. 56.
509
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
510
Id. art. 17.
511
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. See generally id.
512
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 509, art. 17.
513
Id.
514
Id.
515
Id.

 Prisoners of war.505
 Parties in hostilities.506
 Capitulating parties to
hostilities.507
 Municipalities, and
institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences.508
 Individuals.514
 Groups (“in association with others”).515
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1948516

American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of
Man, article XXIII.517
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35***518
(Parties to the
OAS Charter)
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Right to own property.519

Every person.520

 Right not to have property destroyed.524

7

1949521

Convention (IV) Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Fourth Geneva Convention)522

516

196*523

Internees:
 Right to possession of articles of
personal use and of those who have a
personal or sentimental value.525
 Right to remuneration.526
 Right to retain a certain amount of
money, to be able to make purchases.527

 Individuals
and
groups during armed conflict or military occupations.528
 Internees.529

Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OAS Doc. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21,
rev. 6, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 (1992).
517
Id.
518
Member States, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
519
American Declaration, supra note 516, art. XXIII.
520
Id.
521
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
522
Id.
523
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280158b1a (last visited on Oct. 27,
2017).
524
See Geneva Convention, supra note 521, art. 53.
525
Id. art. 97.
526
Id. art. 98.
527
Id. art. 98.
528
Id. art. 53.
529
Id. art. 98.
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1949

9

1951536

10

542

1952
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ILO Convention (No. 95)
Concerning the Protection
of Wages (No. 95)531

Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees537

Protocol to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, article 1543

530

532

98

145538

544

45

[Vol. 72:580

 Right to receive wages directly, regularly, in legal tender, and without deductions.533
 Right to dispose freely of wages.534
 Right to treatment which is (i) as
favorable as possible, and (ii) not less
favorable as other aliens in the acquisition of property and other rights pertaining thereto.539
 Right to movable and immovable
property (industrial property also protected by art. 14).540
 Right to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.545
 Right not to be deprived of possessions (with exceptions).546

Convention (No. 95) Concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949,
138 U.N.T.S. 226 (entered into force Sept. 24, 1952).
531
Id.
532
Ratifications of C095 – Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95),
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::
NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312240 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
533
See Convention Concerning the Protection of Wages, supra note 530, arts.
3.1, 5, 9.
534
Id. art. 6.
535
Id. art. 2.1.
536
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
537
Id.
538
The 1951 Refugee Convention, UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
539
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 536, art. 13.
540
Id. arts. 13, 14.
541
Id. art. 3.
542
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
543
Id. art. 1.
544
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 187, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/187/signatures?p_auth=cPfiRlgV (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
545
Protocol to the Convention, supra note 542, art 1.
546
Id.
547
Id.

 “[A]ll persons to
whom wages are paid or
payable.”535



Refugees.541

 Every natural or legal
person.547
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Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons,
article 13.549

Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of
the Convention.555

548

695

89550

 Right to treatment which is (i) as
favorable as possible, and (ii) not less
favorable as other aliens in the acquisition of property and other rights pertaining thereto.551
 Right to movable and immovable
property (industrial property also protected by art. 14).552



Stateless persons.553

127*556

 Obligation to protect cultural property.557



States.558

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960).
549
Id. art. 13.
550
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (last visited
Feb. 28, 2018).
551
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 548, art.
13.
552
Id. arts. 13, 14.
553
Id. art. 13.
554
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
555
Id.
556
State Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order=alpha (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
557
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 554, art. 2.
558
Id. art. 3.
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1955
(adopted in
1957 and
1977 by
ECOSOC,
revised by
U.N. GA in
2015)559

Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners.560

14

1957563

ILO Convention (No. 107)
Concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries.564

15

1961
(revised in
1996)569

European Social Charter.570

13
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 Right to a safe custody of money,
valuables, clothing and other effects.561



27565

 Right of ownership of lands traditionally occupied.566
 Respect to traditional mechanisms
of transmission of rights.567

 Indigenous peoples:
both individuals and collectives.568

47571

 Right to fair remuneration for
work.572



-

559
G.A. Res. 70/175, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) (Dec. 17, 2015).
560
Id.
561
Id. r. 67.
562
Id.
563
Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries,
June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247.
564
Id.
565
Ratification of C107 – Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention,
1957 (No. 107), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018).
566
ILO Convention No. 107, supra note 563, art. 11.
567
Id. art. 13.
568
Id. art. 11.
569
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
570
Id.
571
European Social Charter Signatures & Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter/signatures-ratifications (last updated Mar. 21, 2016).
572
European Social Charter, supra note 569, pt. I, princ. 4.
573
Id. pt. I.

Prisoners.562

Workers.573
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1961574

Rome Convention for the
Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, article 7(1).575
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93576

 Right to the protection of performances.577

 Performers, producers
of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.578



 Agricultural
cers.589

17

1961579

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.580

191*581

 Right to inviolability of property,
residence, papers and correspondence.582
 Right to be exempt from taxation.583

18

585

ILO Convention (No. 117)
Concerning Basic Aims
and Standards of Social
Policy, article 4.586

33587

 Right to ownership and use of land,
which must serve certain social purposes.588

1962

574

International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
575
Id.
576
WIPO-Administered Treatises: Rome Convention (Total Contracting Parties: 93), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
577
Convention for the Protections of Performers, supra note 574, art. 7.
578
Id. art. 2.
579
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
580
Id.
581
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III3&chapter=3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
582
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 579, art. 30.
583
Id. art. 34.
584
See generally id.
585
Convention (No. 117) Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy, June 22, 1962, 494 U.N.T.S. 249.
586
Id.
587
Ratification of C117 – Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312262 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
588
Convention (No. 117) Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy, supra note 585, art. 4.
589
Id.

Diplomatic agents.584
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590

1965

1969597
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International Convention
on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 5.591

American Convention on
Human Rights, article
21.598
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179*

 Right to own property without racial discrimination.593
 Right to inherit without racial discrimination.594

 Individuals.595
 Groups (“in association with others”).596

24****599

 Right to the use and enjoyment of
property.600
 Right not to be deprived of property unless under certain conditions.601



592

590
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969).
591
Id. art. 5.
592
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en#1 (last visited Mar. 1,
2018).
593
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 590, art. 5(d)(v).
594
Id. art. 5(d)(vi).
595
Id. art. 5(d)(v).
596
Id.
597
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
598
Id. art. 21.
599
American Convention on Human Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2018).
600
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 597, art. 21.
601
Id.
602
Id.

Everyone.602
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Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.604
Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Producers
of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication
of Their Phonograms, article 2.609

603

699

131****605

 Right to the protection of cultural
property.606



79*610

 Protection against the duplication
and distribution of phonograms.611

 Producers of phonograms.612

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat.
2350, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
604
Id.
605
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=
alpha (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
606
Convention on Preventing Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 603.
607
Id.
608
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866
U.N.T.S. 67.
609
Id. art. 2.
610
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS
AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF THEIR PHONOGRAMS, UN TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/
Chapter%20XIV/XIV-4.en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
611
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms, supra note
608.
612
Id.

Everyone.607

700

23

24

1979613

1981619
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, articles 15 & 16.614

African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, article
14.620

613
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189****615

 Equal right to administer property.616
 Same rights as men in respect of
the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and
disposition of property.617



Women.618

39621





Human beings.623

Right to property.622

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
614
Id. arts. 15, 16.
615
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
616
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, supra
note 613, art. 15.2.
617
See id. at art. 16.1(h).
618
Id. arts. 15, 16.
619
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 245.
620
Id. art. 14.
621
See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, UN TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=
08000002800cb09f (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
622
See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 619, art.
14.
623
See id. pmbl.
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701

1989

ILO Convention (No. 169)
Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.625

22626

 Right of ownership and possession
over the lands traditionally occupied.627
 Right to safeguard the lands not
occupied, but accessed for subsistence
and traditional activities.628
 Right to participate in the use, management and conservation of natural
resources pertaining to their lands.629

1990631

International Convention
on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of
Their Families, article
15.632

51633

 Right not to be deprived of property arbitrarily.634

624

624

Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 7, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
625
Id.
626
Ratification of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989
(No. 169), INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018).
627
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, supra note 624, art. 14.
628
Id.
629
Id. art. 15.
630
Id. art. 1.
631
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
632
Id. art. 15.
633
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&
lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
634
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, supra note 631.
635
Id.



 Migrant workers and
members of their families.635

Indigenous peoples.630
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27

1994636

North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),
chapter 11.637

3*638

 Right to compensation for governmental expropriations and other protections for “investments” and “investors.”639

 Foreign
investors
from NAFTA.640

28

1994641

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.642

164*643

 Right to the protection of intellectual property.644

 Everyone entitled to
intellectual property.645

29

1995646

UNIDROIT Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.647

42648

 Right to compensation for returning a stolen or illegally exported cultural object.649

 Possessors of stolen or
illegally exported cultural
objects.650

636

North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
637
Id. ch. 11.
638
North American Free Trade Agreement, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.,
https://www.asil.org/eisil/north-american-free-trade-agreement (last visited Mar.
1, 2018).
639
Id. art. 1102.
640
Id. art. 1101.
641
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
642
Id.
643
IP-Related Multilateral Treaties: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&
group_id=22 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
644
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 641.
645
Id. art. 3(1).
646
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 2421
U.N.T.S. 457, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
647
Id.
648
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
(Rome, 1995) – Status, INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L.
(UNIDROIT), http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
649
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 646, art. 4(1).
650
Id. art. 3(1).
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651

Arab Charter on Human
Rights, article 25 (1994
version, which never entered into force),652 article
31 (2004 version, entered
into force in 2008).653

31

2000
(legally
binding as
of 2009)657

Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European
Union.658

659

32

2000663

United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime.664

30

1994/2004

651



“Every citizen.”656

28

 Right to own, use, dispose of and
bequeath lawfully acquired possessions.660
 Right to intellectual property.661



“Everyone.”662

189*665

 Implies the existence of a right to
acquisition, possession or use of property.666



Everyone.667

22654



703

Right to own private property.655

League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994,
reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (1997) (never entered into force).
652
Id. art. 25.
653
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 31, May 24,
2004, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar.
15, 2008).
654
Arab Charter on Human Rights, UNHCR: REFWORLD, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
655
Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 653, art. 31.
656
Id.
657
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1.
658
Id.
659
Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/countries_en (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
660
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 657, art.
17(1).
661
Id. art. 17(2).
662
Id. art. 17(1).
663
G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000).
664
Id.
665
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1,
2018).
666
G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 663, art. 6(1)(b)(i).
667
Id. art. 6.
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34

2003668

676

2006
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Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in
Africa.669

Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, article 12.5.677
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36670

 Right to acquire and administer
property during marriage.671
 Right to an equitable sharing of
property deriving from marriage.672
 Right to property over land.673
 Right to inherit.674



175****678

 Equal right to own or inherit property.679
 Equal right to control their own financial affairs and have access to credit.680
 Equal right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.681

 Persons with disabilities.682

668
Org. of African Unity (OAU), Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005).
669
Id.
670
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
671
Id. art. 6(j).
672
Id. art. 7(d).
673
Id. art. 19(c).
674
Id. art. 21(1).
675
Id.
676
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
677
Id. art. 12(5).
678
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), UN: DIV.
FOR SOC. POL’Y & DEV. D ISABILITY, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018).
679
Id. art. 12(5).
680
Id.
681
Id.
682
Id.

Women.675
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683

2012
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ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, right 17.684

(ASEAN has
10 member
states)685

705

 Right to own, use, dispose of and
give lawfully acquired possessions.686
 Right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of property.687

683
Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) Human Rights Declaration art. 17, Nov. 18, 2012, available at http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf.
684
Id.
685
Id.
686
Id.
687
Id.
688
Id.



“Every person.”688

